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## Maritime Industry

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#### No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

#### triggers miscalc.

Ashford 4-1-2021, PhD, senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. (Emma, "Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/01/china-usa-great-power-competition-recipe-for-disaster/)

Instead, the “return of great-power competition” is essentially an easier way of admitting that the United States is in relative decline. The unipolar moment—the three-decade period of U.S. global predominance that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union—is ending. In the parlance of political science, other states are beginning to balance against the United States. In layman’s terms, this means that with the United States in relative decline, other states are increasingly willing to take actions they would not have during the 1990s, whether it’s Russian intervention in Syria, Chinese claims to the South China Sea, or European steps to circumvent U.S. sanctions legislation. Irving Kristol, considered the godfather of neoconservatism, once noted that a neoconservative is just a liberal who’s been mugged by reality; some of the loudest voices proclaiming an era of great-power competition are just liberal internationalists who have been mugged by the reality of power politics.

Yet if this were all there was to it, the debate surrounding great-power competition would be far less problematic. Scholars and pundits would update their mental models for a more competitive world and move on with their lives. Instead, foreign-policy circles in Washington are increasingly fixated on the notion that the United States must commit to competition with China, Russia, and other states.

Great-power competition is portrayed less as a fact of life and more as a strategy in and of itself. Certainly, some authors do suggest a potential endpoint to great-power competition, such as Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, whose recent piece in Foreign Policy argued that competition between the United States and China would only lessen when the regime in Beijing collapsed. But they are still unclear on why we should pursue an existential Cold War-style struggle with China, rather than a more measured approach of competitive coexistence.

This example is emblematic of the debate on great-power competition as a whole. As a grand strategy—what the Yale University professor John Lewis Gaddis once described as “the calculated relationship of means to large ends”—great-power competition is sorely lacking. For starters, it’s not clear whether competition is itself a means or an end.

The 2017 National Security Strategy, for example, describes the world as an “arena of continuous competition” for which the United States must prepare. Whether it is domestic infrastructure projects, student loan forgiveness, repairs to democratic institutions, or increasing the birth rate, a wide range of policy priorities are now portrayed as essential to the pursuit of great-power competition. This suggests that great-power competition is itself an end. Why the country is compelled to compete in this way typically goes unstated.

Indeed, if great-power competition is instead a means to an end, it’s not at all clear what those ends are. There’s rarely a concrete goal among those who proselytize in favor of a strategy of great-power competition. Consider how the topic is portrayed by former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster in his recent book. He opens by noting that “after the end of the Cold War, America and other free and open societies forgot that they had to compete to keep their freedom, security, and prosperity” while later arguing that states must “compete thoroughly as the best means of avoiding confrontation.” Confusingly, he portrays competition as both an alternative to conflict and as a Manichean struggle between good and evil, with the United States beset by adversaries on all sides.

It’s easy to dismiss this kind of rhetoric as silly, but it also carries substantial danger. For one thing, the focus on competition masks a whole series of underlying assumptions about the international system and America’s role in it. Washington’s policy community appears convinced that we are headed for a more dangerous world, one in which the United States must push back against the perceived aggression of states like China and Russia. Though articles almost always include an obligatory aside—that cooperation with China on climate change is a must!—the frame is almost uniformly confrontational.

To be clear, there are good reasons for Washington’s strategic community to perceive an increasingly competitive world. The gap between the United States and other countries is narrowing militarily; it has already closed by some economic measures. And pushback against U.S. foreign-policy choices among other states has increased in recent years, from Chinese attempts to revise maritime rules to Russia’s aggressive targeting of foreign elections. But a more competitive world isn’t the same thing as an all-out struggle. Great-power competition is often portrayed as an all-or-nothing conflict, where revisionist autocracies are challenging the United States in every sphere. In reality, thus far China and Russia are only selectively revisionist, attempting to change the status quo where it suits their interests and to maintain it in other places.

The risks of the all-or-nothing approach to global politics cannot be overstated. As Fareed Zakaria put it recently, “The United States risks squandering the hard-won gains from four decades of engagement with China, encouraging Beijing to adopt confrontational policies of its own, and leading the world’s two largest economies into a treacherous conflict of unknown scale and scope.” Indeed, if one assumes—as much of the writing on great-power competition does—that China and Russia are implacable foes of the United States determined to destroy the existing order and overturn U.S. hegemony, then policies that would otherwise be unthinkable are suddenly on the table.

Military buildup in Europe and Asia becomes necessary, even if it raises the risk of open conflict with another nuclear power. Economic decoupling seems vital to protect supply chains, though studies show that the costs to U.S. companies and workers would be extreme. A recent report by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s China Center, for example, estimated that the U.S. economy could lose up to $1 trillion in growth if tariffs were more broadly applied to all U.S.-China trade. Restrictions on tourism or on Chinese students studying in the United States would cost between $15 billion and $30 billion per year.

The bottom line is simple: It’s easy to make fun of great-power competition as a meaningless buzzword or as Washington’s foreign-policy elite rediscovering that other states get to have a say in world politics. But as the political scientist Robert Kagan wrote recently, the biggest question of the coming decades may be whether countries can “confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war.” In that context, the ~~blind~~ pursuit of a strategy of great-power competition is irresponsible and shortsighted.

The last time the United States single-mindedly pursued a poorly thought-out slogan masquerading as a strategy, it ended up fighting a two-decade global war on terrorism, a conflict from which it is still struggling to extricate itself and that had immense negative effects on the country’s foreign relations and its domestic liberties. Yet if today’s leaders are not careful, the rhetoric of great-power competition could drag the United States into a conflict even more costly and damaging.

#### China isn’t revisionist.

McKinney 19, \*Jared Morgan; PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); \*\*Nicholas Butts; Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader. He holds an LL.M. from Peking University, an MSc from The London School of Economics and an MPA from Harvard University where he was also a Crown Prince Frederik Scholar and a Cheng Fellow. (Winter 2019, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, pg. 75-76, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JIPA/journals/Volume-02\_Issue-4/McKinney.pdf)

In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.

When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27

Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31

Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

#### Russia isn’t revisionist.

Götz & Merlen 18, \*Elias Götz, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Uppsala Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (UCRS), Uppsala University, Sweden. \*\*Camille-Renaud Merlen, PhD Candidate in International Relations. (11-15-2018; “Russia and the question of world order”, *European Politics and Society*, Volume 20, Issue 2, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181)

To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective. First, it adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining its predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness. This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims about Russian identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach to the liberal international order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov, 2016Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Russia’s foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military activity in other post-Soviet states (Götz, 2016Götz, E. (2016). Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: Three contending perspectives. Contemporary Politics, 22(3), 249–266. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2016.1201313, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016Lewis, D. (2016, May 24). The “Moscow Consensus”: Constructing autocracy in post-Soviet Eurasia. The Foreign Policy Centre. Retrieved from https://fpc.org.uk/moscow-consensus-constructing-autocracy-post-soviet-eurasia/ ) writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…) has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by Russian politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. ), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly fit with a revisionist imperial agenda.Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary great power than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood. As Carpenter (2017Carpenter, T. G. (2017, January 19). The simple reason Russia and America keep inching towards crisis. National Interest (online). Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-simple-reason-russia-america-keep-inching-towards-crisis-19117 [Google Scholar] , January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of influence] concept as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration?For another, interference in the domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016Levin, D. H. (2016). When the great power gets a vote: The effects of great power electoral interventions on election results. International Studies Quarterly, 60(2), 189–202. doi: 10.1093/isq/sqv016 ). It is therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark. Any international relations scholar worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings.

#### Treat their evidence with skepticism---there are strong financial incentives to defend hegemony and demonize alternatives

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American elite knowledge networks center on the strategic and heavily interconnected corporate-philanthropic foundation. The liberal Ford and Rockefeller foundations and conservative variants all fund knowledge networks.28 Unburdened by electors or shareholders, these institutions are governed by trustees drawn from corporations, government, corporate media, and elite universities. Their elitist mindsets and ethno-racial and class identities differentiate these trustees from the majority of Americans. We can track the rise of American global hegemony by exploring the increasing significance of foundations and the institutional architecture that owes its origins to concentrated corporate wealth. At home, this comprised a dense network of think tanks, university foreign affairs organizations, area studies, and social-scientific programs, all of which interlinked with practitioners in politics, media, and government. These elite knowledge networks built long-term relationships that created pathways for the international circulation of ideas, people, and money, and usually connected strongly with American organizations like the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). These knowledge networks’ greatest achievement is the elaboration of a liberal-internationalist elite consensus that rejects isolationism and spans the two main political parties, the media, and attentive publics. With the American state’s full cooperation, such knowledge networks helped to establish the post-1945 liberal international order that included Bretton Woods, the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.

Official institutions of the liberal international order included the intertwined spines of the private and state-private institutional architecture that had been established during the Cold War to perform the major functions of US hegemonic knowledge networks. These networks grew deep roots in core Western states and civil societies. Symbiotic with NATO, European unity, and the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, such networks provided an international umbrella and developed politically powerful domestic constituencies that were invested in the liberal international order.29

Nevertheless, hegemony studies neglects American ideational-infrastructural power that is operationalized and embedded in influential power-knowledge networks, with linkages that unify private/public domains and international/domestic spheres, and that legitimize domestic vertical power inequality and horizontal inequalities between societies. Those networks are the power technology of the foreign policy establishment.30 Such neglect diminishes our understanding of the forces that perpetuate American hegemony and enable hegemonic elites to block or manage discontent. This article’s neo-Gramscian argument is that, despite crises and challenges that include the disruptive effects of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and subsequent Twitter-disseminated rhetoric, those networks continue to successfully manage, channel, or block threats to American hegemony. Such networks are likely to remain significant during the Trump presidency, and to constrain attempts to radically alter the liberal international order.

American hegemony, because it is imperial in character and rooted in domestic power elites, is contested at home and abroad—more or less openly—depending on the balance of forces. Hegemony sets requirements on the hegemon. These requirements include delivery of certain freedoms, rights, security, and opportunities, which together construct “the American dream,” as well as a stable world order in which prosperity increases and aspirations appear achievable.31

#### Decline solves transition conflict---only clinging causes war.

MacDonald & Parent 18, \*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. \*\*PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. (Paul K. and Joseph M., “Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment”, pg. 2-3, Published by *Cornell University Press*)

In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.

Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cutthroat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strongpoints. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on conditions and the enemies faced.

Third, after depth, structural conditions are the most important factors shaping how great powers respond to relative decline. Four conditions catalyze the incentives for declining states to retrench. One is the declining state’s rank. States in the top rungs of the great power hierarchy have more resources and margin for error than those lower down, so there is less urgency for them to retrench. Another is the availability of allies. Where states can shift burdens to capable regional powers with similar preferences, retrenchment is less risky and difficult. Yet another is the interdependence of commitments. When states perceive commitments in one place as tightly linked to commitments elsewhere, pulling back becomes harder and less likely. The last catalyst is the calculus of conquest. If aggression pays, then retrenchment does not, and great powers will be loath to do it. The world is not just complex and cutthroat, it is also dynamic. No set of conditions is everlasting, and leaders must change with the times.

Empirically, this work aims to add value by being the first to study systematically all modern shifts in the great power pecking order. We find sixteen cases of relative decline since 1870, when reliable data for the great powers become available, and compare them to their non-declining counterparts across a variety of measures. To preview the findings, retrenchment is by far the most common response to relative decline, and declining powers behave differently from non-declining powers. States in decline are more likely to cut the size of their military forces and budgets and in extreme cases are more likely to form alliances. This does not, however, make them ripe for exploitation; declining states perform comparatively well in militarized disputes. Our headline finding, however, is that states that retrench recover their prior rank with some regularity, but those that fail to retrench never do. These results challenge theories of grand strategy and war, offer guidance to policymakers, and indicate overlooked paths to peace.

### 1NC---!D---Navy

#### Naval deterrence fails and is unsustainable.

van Hooft 21, senior strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the co-chair of its Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, and a former postdoctoral fellow at the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Paul, 2-23-2021, "Don’t Knock Yourself Out: How America Can Turn the Tables on China by Giving Up the Fight for Command of the Seas", *War on the Rocks*, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/dont-knock-yourself-out-how-america-can-turn-the-tables-on-china-by-giving-up-the-fight-for-command-of-the-seas/)

The United States should give up its quest for command of the maritime commons in the Western Pacific. The struggle is based on a false premise — that if the United States loses command of the seas, China will step in the fill the vacuum. In fact, even if the United States loses command of the maritime commons, China is not positioned to gain it. However, by positioning China as an existential threat, the United States is boxing itself in politically. The United States courts disaster when it overextends itself by seeking military primacy in the region. There is one fundamental reason: the tyranny of distance. The maritime nature of American power is a double-edged sword, specifically when it comes to its competition with China. American command over the maritime commons allows the U.S. military to project power globally, but when that power is projected at a great distance from U.S. shores, as in the Western Pacific, U.S. forces are particularly vulnerable to measures designed to raise the costs of access. First, a strategy of maintaining command of the maritime commons in the face of anti-access measures exposes U.S. dependence on allied territory to support deployed forces through basing, infrastructure, and logistics. Second, as the costs and risks of maintaining access increase, the asymmetrical stakes become more constraining for the United States than for China. Overcommitment has historically been endemic to U.S. grand strategy, but it is especially dangerous now that China is capable of inflicting heavy costs upon the United States. Instead, the United States should, together with its allies and partners, focus on denying China command of the Pacific maritime commons. It is cheaper and easier to deny command of the seas than to exercise it. If China cannot gain command of the seas, the Western Pacific will remain a contested environment — one that China cannot break out of. China would either be forced to accept the status quo or make a first move in which it overextends itself. While giving up command of the seas may seem unpalatable, it need not be fatal to the United States and its allies and partners’ collective goal to maintain the regional balance of power. The alternative is unlikely to end well for them.

### 1NC---Russia-China Axis Turn

#### Pursing heg locks in overstretch and a Russia-China axis.

Porter 19, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London and a Fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. (Patrick Porter (2019) “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590079>)

There is little sign of active “splitting” currently, however. (A notable exception is recent collaboration with Beijing over North Korea’s nuclear program, even if it is marred by tension and distrust.) Rather, the United States is encouraging the perception of a common enemy. By militarily positioning itself within striking distance of Russia and China through a semi-encircling presence in eastern Europe and north-east Asia, expanding alliances, entertaining further expansion, ramping up freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea, reviving the pursuit of an antiballistic missile shield, establishing a reputation as a sponsor of “color revolutions” and as an overthrower of regimes, Washington helps draw Beijing and Moscow closer together into a balancing coalition. A nascent Russia-China alliance is suggested by Russia’s own interagency inquiry into the possibility, the frequency of Putin-Xi contact, deliberate tightening of economic interaction, and overt displays and declarations of close military ties through joint exercises and arms sales.24

It does not have to be this way. The United States has a geopolitical advantage—its distant location. Most powers, most of the time, are more concerned by the potential threat of other nearby land powers than distant sea powers.25Based in the Western hemisphere, the United States has less of a compelling security interest in adversaries ’backyards, allowing Washington the choice of adopting a more distant pose. Russia and China, by contrast, are neighbors so cannot withdraw, both are primarily continental land-based military powers, and historically such proximity can exacerbate rivalries and mutual fears. Sino-Russian antagonism remains a built-in possibility. Only under the right conditions, though, can the rivalries again grow. This is not a plea for a trilateral realignment whereby one state agrees to be the United States’ “geopolitical hammer” and teams up with Washington to contain the other. Rather, it is to suggest that more American restraint in one theater could make space for Russia-China frictions to take effect in another.

This geopolitical principle will prove controversial. The bipartisan consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume that only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice. Policymakers assume that the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power, or to apply enough power efficiently enough. They then call for the allocation of more resources and their smarter use in order to sustain U.S. dominance. The congressionally-mandated2018National Defense Strategy Commission report, appointed to make recommendations, is a case in point. It takes dominance as the obvious U.S. national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, U.S. military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars has eroded, due tor-educed defense expenditure, and advises that it spend more while cutting entitlements.26On this logic, a defense budget that is already10 times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s is not enough, for U.S. grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to achieve unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is not considered.

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.

Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expend-able for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources.

To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.

Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### Russia-China coordination triggers global war.

Kendall-Taylor & Shullman 19, \*PhD in Political Science from Yale, Senior Fellow in and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security an Adjunct Professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. \*\*PhD, Senior Adviser at the International Republican Institute and an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. (Andrea, David, 5/14/19, "A Russian-Chinese Partnership Is a Threat to U.S. Interests", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-14/russian-chinese-partnership-threat-us-interests)

While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit.

Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States.

China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

### 1NC---Global Governance Turn

#### Retrenchment key to a concert strategy---that unlocks global governance.

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I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.

Security and The Balance of Power

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony.

Reviving Global Governance

A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.

The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, it would enable the drastic shift away from fossil fuels necessary to avoid climate apocalypse.

In Search of a Global Public

Naysayers might argue that all this degree of international cooperation sounds idealist, but all are possible in a context of declining great power competition. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy.

If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. By prioritizing cooperation on non-state issues and resolving great power competition through equal recognition, they can realize security for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.

#### Global governance checks emerging tech, pandemics, and war---extinction.

Bailey 18, Professional technologist and strategic manager. Robert earned his Master of Science Degree in Computer science in 2009, and has worked since then has a product engineer developing Microsoft stack technologies. (Robert, 9-5-201, "Why do we need global governance?" *Global Governance*, https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/)

Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time, the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before seen.

The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for failure.2 3

We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day. The progress of technological research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs, nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier.

There are other problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress. Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4

Other problems have emerged precisely because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways - we refer the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves.

Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

Effective global governance is global governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems. Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global governance can be achieved.

### 1NC---China Turn---Counterbalancing

#### Primacy in Asia is unsustainable---pursuing it causes counterbalancing and miscalc.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, 89-90)

It Is Difficult to Stop China’s Continued Rise

Second, neo-primacy’s logic rests on shaky foundations, as the United States’ opportunity to reclaim preeminence is extremely small, and the effort will likely prove both counterproductive and dangerous. Baldly, if the United States was unable to keep China from becoming a near-peer competitor in the first place via classic primacy, it is even less likely that the United States has the wherewithal to put the Chinese genie back in the bottle and now push China from the great power ranks via neo-primacy.

States generally balance when confronted with a direct external threat. This tendency is significant in the US-China context because, under neo-primacy, the United States would effectively declare itself a direct threat to China at a time when US analysts acknowledge China has a growing capacity to oppose American plans and ambitions.53 Though China is not poised to dominate East Asia, it can thus be expected to devote its own considerable resources toward keeping pace with US efforts to arrest China’s rise and/or shift the relative distribution of power in the US favor. The odds of major crises would then increase as Washington and Beijing maneuver for position, in turn raising the odds of escalatory spirals, miscalculation, and war.54

Trends in military spending and recent economic developments suggest China’s capacity to oppose neo-primacy and a US drive to reclaim untrammeled preeminence. On one level, China currently devotes a smaller share of its economic wealth to military purposes than the United States, yet it has still managed to reduce American military advantages. This implies that Beijing could do quite a bit to frustrate American policy simply by allocating more to international purposes; if the United States feels pressured by a China that spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense, a China that spends 3 or 4 percent of GDP on defense—roughly what the United States has spent since the Cold War—would present a still larger problem and place the United States in an even worse position.55

Nor is it just military spending that underlines neo-primacy’s limitations. After all, ongoing efforts to decouple the US and Chinese economies—designed partly to limit Chinese growth—has pushed Beijing toward fostering a self-sustaining domestic economy able to withstand “sustained acrimony with the United States.” Given this, it is reasonable to infer that additional economic efforts to outpace Beijing will generate countervailing Chinese responses.56 Considering, too, that China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than the United States’ (even during COVID-19) and that the country has worked to narrow the USChina technological gap,57 the PRC’s ability to keep pace with the United States cannot be discounted.58 Shifts in the distribution of power since the Cold War make neo-primacy self-defeating by enabling China to match US efforts while risking US national security along the way. In this sense, neoprimacy risks exacerbating the very problem it seeks to address.

### 1NC---Russia Turn

#### Attempting to maintain hegemony over Russia backfires and triggers nuclear cyber-war.

Beebe 19, vice president and director of studies at the Center for the National Interest, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, former head of Russia analysis at the CIA. (George, 10-7-2019, "We’re More at Risk of Nuclear War With Russia Than We Think", *POLITICO Magazine*, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436>)

The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels, proxy battles, information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks. If the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will end any differently?

But wars do not always begin by design. Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing geopolitical ambitions, distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that neither side wants nor expects.

In fact, cyber technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations, media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber world into the physical domain is a serious danger.

Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will fire when buttons are pushed. This makes containing a crisis that might arise between U.S. and Russian forces over Ukraine, Iran or anything else much more difficult. It is not hard to imagine a crisis scenario in which Russia cyber operators gain access to a satellite system that controls both U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons systems, leaving the American side uncertain about whether the intrusion is meant to gather information about U.S. war preparations or to [preclude] ~~disable~~ our ability to conduct nuclear strikes. This could cause the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces an urgent “use it or lose it” nuclear launch decision. It doesn’t help that the lines of communication between the United States and Russia necessary for managing such situations are all but severed.

A related, second assumption American policymakers make is seeing the Russian threat as primarily a deterrence problem. The logic goes something like this: Wars often happen because the states that start them believe they can win, but the United States can disabuse a would-be aggressor of this belief through a show of force, thus deterring conflict. Indeed, Washington seems convinced that showing the Kremlin it will punish Russian transgressions—through toughened economic sanctions, an enhanced military posture in Europe and more aggressive cyber operations—is the best path to preserving peace.

But, when dealing with states that believe they are under some form of assault, focusing on deterrence can be counterproductive. Rather than averting aggression by demonstrating the will to fight back, America might be unintentionally increasing the odds of a war. To a great degree, this is the situation the United States already faces. Years of enlargement of NATO and perceived U.S. involvement in Russia’s internal affairs have convinced the Kremlin that America poses an existential threat. In turn, Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, coupled with a string of aggressions against its neighbors, have convinced Washington that Moscow is going for the West’s jugular.

The United States experienced this spiral phenomenon with Georgia in 2008. Convinced that Russia harbored aggressive designs on its southern neighbor, Washington policymakers accelerated U.S. military training in Georgia, openly advocated bringing Tbilisi into the NATO alliance and issued multiple warnings to Moscow against military action, believing this firm resolve would deter Russian aggression. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Russia grew increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Georgian membership in NATO, while Tbilisi felt emboldened to launch a military operation in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, which yielded an immediate and massive Russian military response.

## Supply Chains

### 1NC---Link

### 1NC---AT: Trade Escalation

#### Trade doesn’t promote cooperation.

EIU 19 — The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is the research arm of The Economist Group, publisher of The Economist. Contributors include: Conor Griffin – Project director; Diana Hindle Fisher – Project manager; Ailia Haider – Researcher; Kamala Dawar – Contributing researcher; Adam Green – Contributing author; Gareth Owen – Graphic designer; Professor Petros Mavroidis, Columbia University Assistant Professor; Antonia Eliason, University of Mississippi; André Sapir, Bruegel and Université libre de Bruxelles; Professor Robert Howse, New York University; Mark Sanctuary, IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute; Professor James Bacchus, University of Central Florida. (Climate change and trade agreements Friends or foes? *The Economist*; <https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2019/03/icc-report-trade-and-climate-change.pdf>; Accessed 03-04-2021)

\*NDCs = Nationally Determined Contributions

Opportunity 7: International cooperation

The Paris Agreement represented a triumph for global climate diplomacy and an unprecedented recognition of the shared risks posed by climate change. However, to date, the ambition of NDCs has fallen short. If countries are to increase the ambition and viability of their NDCs, international cooperation will be crucial. This year may see a fresh impetus. At COP25 in November, article 6 of the Paris Agreement - which focuses on the cooperation mechanisms that countries can use to implement their NDCs – will be a major focal point.101,102

FTAs could provide a framework for countries to craft, review and renew this climate policy cooperation. Declarations in support of climate policy cooperation, within FTAs, could boost political will among the parties and accelerate the push for stronger regulation to support countries’ NDCs.

Some traditional FTAs sought to increase environmental cooperation among parties, with EUled agreements showing a strong preference for looser cooperation over binding commitments. Contemporary FTAs, particularly those led by the EU, include extensive provisions recognising the importance of parties working together on trade-related aspects of environmental policies. The agreements also cite various multilateral environmental agreements and promote their ratification and implementation. However, these clauses are all non-binding and none of the contemporary agreements explicitly mentions the Paris Agreement, NDCs, specific targets to achieve, or time frames.

The EU–Singapore FTA promotes exchanges of information and cooperation in international forums that address environmental aspects of trade, such as the WTO and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Along with CETA, the EU–Singapore agreement dovetails most closely with the Paris Agreement’s objectives by referencing the UNFCCC Agenda 21 (1992) and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Development (2002). These FTAs seek cooperation and coherence between the two sets of obligations through dialogue and consultations between the parties and with the environmental agreement institutions themselves.

CETA is equally comprehensive, calling on members to cooperate on policies related to domestic mitigation and adaptation, carbon markets, energy efficiency and developing low-carbon technologies. It also encourages members to support impact assessments that gather evidence and information on the implementation of the provisions, and can be distributed to the parties and public stakeholders to facilitate transparency, as well as to make recommendations for improving implementation. It further facilitates cooperation in international forums and the ratification and implementation of MEAs. The CPTPP also outlines an extensive framework for cooperation, as well as a process by which countries should, if relevant, identify and share performance measures to assist in evaluating the efficiency, effectiveness and progress of their cooperation.

KAFTA has the fewest provisions on environmental cooperation,103 although this does not necessarily mean that the commitment to cooperation is weaker. Among other areas, the agreement recognises the importance of cooperating on trade-related aspects of environmental policies, international climate change regimes and biodiversity, including cooperation in relevant regional and international forums.

EIU assessment:

All of the contemporary FTAs promote environmental cooperation between parties and support multilateral environmental agreements. However, these ambitions are limited. The clauses are nonbinding “best endeavour” provisions that do not include target outcomes or formal reporting obligations. The FTAs also do not formalise the need for cooperation in achieving NDCs and the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

Table

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### 1NC---AT: Deglobalization

#### 1---Trade causes existential warming — increases emissions and deters policy solutions.

EIU 19 — The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is the research arm of The Economist Group, publisher of The Economist. Contributors include: Conor Griffin – Project director; Diana Hindle Fisher – Project manager; Ailia Haider – Researcher; Kamala Dawar – Contributing researcher; Adam Green – Contributing author; Gareth Owen – Graphic designer; Professor Petros Mavroidis, Columbia University Assistant Professor; Antonia Eliason, University of Mississippi; André Sapir, Bruegel and Université libre de Bruxelles; Professor Robert Howse, New York University; Mark Sanctuary, IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute; Professor James Bacchus, University of Central Florida. (Climate change and trade agreements Friends or foes? *The Economist*; <https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2019/03/icc-report-trade-and-climate-change.pdf>; Accessed 03-04-2021)

Executive Summary

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has shone a spotlight on the devastating humanitarian consequences the world can expect if global warming exceeds 1.5°C. Despite the 2015 Paris Agreement, most countries’ climate policies show a chronic lack of ambition and the world remains on track for temperature increases of more than 3°C.

Against this backdrop, the world needs transformative solutions. In climate policy discussions, relatively little attention is paid to the global trade architecture. Bilateral, regional or World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade agreements could help to meet climate goals—for example, by removing tariffs and harmonising standards on environmental goods and services, and eliminating distortionary and poorly designed subsidies on fossil fuels and agriculture.

Despite the potential for trade–climate synergies, the weight of historical evidence is heavy in the other direction. Universal tariff reduction has increased trade in carbon-intensive and environmentally destructive products, such as fossil fuels and timber, more than it has for environmental goods. In some cases FTAs can also shrink the “policy space” available to countries to pursue environmental goals, for example if they prohibit, or are perceived to prohibit, a country’s ability to distinguish between products according to emissions released during their production.

This report assesses the degree to which the WTO and four contemporary free trade agreements (FTAs)—CPTPP, EU–Singapore, EU–Canada and Korea–Australia—support seven opportunities for boosting climate-friendly trade flows (see graphic below).

We find that the four contemporary trade agreements are more supportive of these climate goals than their traditional counterparts. For example, the EU-Singapore FTA recognises the need for parties take “proper account” of the need to reduce GHG emissions when designing subsidy systems. The CETA and CPTPP agreements permit parties to promote environmental standards and objectives in their tender specifications. However, overall, the agreements largely fail to support the seven opportunities. Most clauses are based on cooperation, consultation, and best endeavour. Specific or immediate actions are lacking. Transformative policies, such as border adjustment carbon taxes, are largely ignored.

We also find that the WTO’s efforts to pursue climate and environmental goals have largely stalled and its cooperation with international climate policy actors is limited. Post-Paris there is a real concern that ambitious climate policies will fall foul of WTO rules if they are perceived to arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate against third countries.

#### 2---Interdependence makes catastrophic disease inevitable.

Morand & Walther 20, \*Serge Morand; PhD, disease ecologist @ Kasetsart University; \*\*Bruno A. Walther; DPhil, Taipei Medical University (4/20; “The accelerated infectious disease risk in the Anthropocene: more outbreaks and wider global spread”; pg. 3-4; Accessible at: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.20.049866>) \*”to” added to preserve grammatical integrity, brackets denote a change

We here want to draw attention to another important and noteworthy feature of the Anthropocene which greatly affects public health, human well-being, and economic performance. These findings are especially pertinent as the world reels from the health, social and economic impact of the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (El Zowalaty and Järhult, 2020; Ghebreyesus and Swaminathan, 2020; Lorusso et al., 2020). The increasing connectivity of human populations due to international trade and travel (Guimerà et al., 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Brockmann and Helbing, 2013; Gabrielli et al., 2019), the rapid growth of the transport of wild and domesticated animals worldwide (Rosen and Smith, 2010; Schneider, 2012; Rohr et al., 2019; Levitt, 2020), and other factors such as the increasing encroachment of human populations on hitherto isolated wild animal populations through loss and fragmentation of wild habitats (Patz et al., 2004; Despommier et al., 2006; Pongsiri et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2013) have led to a great acceleration of infectious disease risks, e.g., the increase in emerging infectious diseases and drug-resistant microbes since 1940 (Jones et al., 2008) and the increase in the number of disease outbreaks since 1980 (Smith et al., 2014). To expand the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014) to the beginning of the Anthropocene, we investigated whether the number of disease outbreaks has increased since the Second World War. In addition, we examined whether the global pattern of infectious disease outbreaks changed possibly due [to] the increasing connectivity of human populations. In other words, have the disease outbreaks become more globalized in the sense that these outbreaks are increasingly shared by countries worldwide? To investigate these questions, we used a the most complete, reliable, and up-to-date global dataset (GIDEON Informatics, 2020) which had already been used in the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014). This dataset can be used to enumerated the recorded annual number of disease outbreaks. To investigate the changing global patterns of disease outbreaks, we used this dataset to calculate two measures which have been recently introduced into ecological and parasitological studies. These two measures, namely modularity and centrality, quantify the connectivity of bipartite networks. Modularity is defined as the extent to which nodes (specifically, sites and species for presenceabsence matrices) in a compartment are more likely to be connected to each other than to other nodes of the network (Thébault, 2013). The calculation of a modularity measure is useful for global phenomena because it allows the overall level of compartmentalization (or fragmentation) into compartments (or clusters, modules, subgroups, or subsets) of an entire dataset to be quantified. High modularity in a global network means that subgroups of countries and disease outbreaks interact more strongly among themselves (that is, within a compartment) than with the other subgroups (that is, among compartments) (Bordes et al., 2015). Centrality is defined as the degree of the connectedness of a node (e.g., a keystone species in ecological studies; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010). In the context of our study, centrality is the degree of the connectedness of a country and those countries connected to it. We estimated the countries which are the potential centres of disease outbreaks by investigating the eigenvector centrality of a given country in a network of countries which share disease outbreaks among each other. Eigenvector centrality is a generalization of degree centrality, which is the number of connections a country has to other countries in terms of sharing disease outbreaks. Eigenvector centrality considers countries to be highly central if the connected countries to them through shared outbreaks are connected to many other well-connected countries (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001; Wells et al., 2020). Modularity and centrality analyses have been used to investigate various ecological, parasitological and epidemiological questions (e.g., Tylianakis et al., 2007; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010; Anderson and Sukhdeo, 2011; Bascompte and Jordano, 2014; Poisot et al., 2014; Bordes et al., 2015; Genrich et al., 2017). Using a widely used world dataset on infectious disease outbreaks, we here present results which demonstrate that the accelerated number of disease outbreaks and their increased global spread are two further threatening aspects of the accelerated infectious disease risk associated with the globalization process which characterizes the Anthropocene.

#### Extinction---defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization.

A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6

While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).

In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### 3---Interdependence causes war---empirics and asymmetry---can’t overcome fundamental disagreements.

van de Haar 20 (Edwin, independent scholar specializing in the liberal tradition in international political thought. He has lectured in international relations and political theory at Brown University, PhD from Maastricht University (2008), a MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science (1997) and a MA in Political Science from Leiden University (1996), “Free trade does not foster peace,” 2020, DOI: 10.1111/ecaf.12405, DOA: 1-5-2020) //Snowball //strikethrough of rhetoric

The most obvious rebuttal of these arguments is empirical. It just did not happen. Countries trading with each other, all around the globe, have fought wars with one another, over and over again. Some recent examples are Russia and Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen. As Smith predicted, human nature is an important factor in the explanation. People will quarrel and fight: ultimately emotions rule reason. In the domestic situation, there is hardly anyone who thinks that people can do without police and judiciary, because some people simply will not obey the rules. The international system is without a court with enforcement powers. There are some structural constraints, but it remains a human affair. The fundamental insights of Smith and his contemporaries into human behaviour do not amount to some oldfashioned idea, long refuted by modern science. They are confirmed not only by modern economists such as Kahneman (2011) and international relations specialists such as Waltz (1954, pp. 16–79) and Donelan (2007), but also by theorists working on the border between evolutionary psychology and international affairs (Rosen, 2005; Rubin, 2002; Thayer, 2004).

The relationship between trade and economic interdependence is also far more complex. Economic interdependence matters sometimes, but it cannot trump power politics. As Copeland (2015, pp. 1–50, 428–46) makes clear, economic interdependence is sometimes a constraint on violent action by a state. Yet it could just as well be a cause of violent action, especially of a pre-emptive nature in the event that actors expect to be cut off from trade and other economic resources in the near future. In this way, the benefits of continued trade lose out against the expected economic vulnerability. Sobek (2009, pp. 107–27) adds that trade relations might lead to uneven power relationships, which may be a cause of war as well.

Also relevant here is the fact that free trade does not normally result in bilateral interdependence, except for trade in the rarest goods. Free trade leads to multilateral trade relations, and consequently there may be more than one country where particular goods can be bought. Therefore, in times of war, it is relatively easy to switch to suppliers from country A to country B or C. In this way warfare may be a less costly option than is assumed by the idea of economic interdependence.

Public opinion is not automatically opposed to war, as Cobden painfully found out during the Crimean War (1853–56). This has been evident many times since, not least in the two world wars. So the idea of public opinion as a pacifying factor influencing decision-makers must be discarded. It must also be noted that the public in any case hardly ever influences foreign policy decisions on war and peace (Hill, 2003, pp. 250–82).

Trade is unable to foster peace, because it is unable to overcome many causes of war. Think about cultural and religious differences, geopolitical causes such as the fight for natural resources, including increasingly rare raw materials, or more traditional wars between great powers or their proxies over a border dispute. States may also act against their economic interest for some perceived higher goal (Coker, 2014). The causes of war are often multifaceted and complex. Wars happen because people have reasons to fight, in the form of goals and grievances, and possess enough resources and resolve (Ohlson, 2009). Trade relations are just one factor in the mix of causes of war, which include such coincidental factors as chance, luck, or reckless behaviour by individuals who happen to influence public policy. International commerce is simply not a “perfectly effective antiwar device” (Suganami, 1996, pp. 153–210). The best one can say is that the protection of trade relations is sometimes one of the factors in the decision not to wage war. Nothing less, nothing more.

To sum up, many of Adam Smith's arguments still stand, and are confirmed or complemented by modern research. There is no solid ground for the expectation that trade promotes, fosters, or leads to peace. Generally, international economic interests are not the crucial factors in decisions over war and peace. Too many other factors come into play. To believe that trade fosters peace was folly even hundreds of years ago. To still think so is to believe in fairy tales, to be ~~blinded~~ [confused] by the correlates computed by limited yet available datasets, or both.

#### 4---Globalization causes populism, that turns case.

Gonzalez-Vicente 18, University Lecturer in Global Political Economy @ U Leiden (Ruben, “The liberal peace fallacy: violent neoliberalism and the temporal and spatial traps of state-based approaches to peace,” *Territoriality, Politics, Governance*, 8.1)

Yet, the contemporary ascension of nationalist and populist movements and leaders that herald deeply illiberal views (Xi included) must come as no surprise after decades of neoliberal triumphalism and the promotion of a transnational order that placed the crafting of a world market above the needs of societies themselves. In such a context, the contemporary rise of nationalism and populisms across the world is not some liberal order antithesis emerging from a vacuum, but rather a logical consequence of this liberal order, constituting an often reactionary ‘counter movement’ that cannot be tackled with liberal prescriptions for increased market globalization (Polanyi, 2001). This paper takes aim at the now long-held and recently revitalized argument for a liberal peace. While not attempting to predict any specific outcome regarding the future of global peace, it argues that the rise of illiberal and reactionary discourses that we now observe, and their potential corollaries, must be understood in a dialectical sense as the result of a liberal market-oriented inter-state order that failed to tackle the great social dislocation that it played a fundamental role in fomenting. To develop this critique, I draw upon three main bodies of literature that, despite their apparent affinities, are seldom brought together. These include Polanyi and Gramsci-inspired understandings of hegemonic crisis, counter-movements, and the rise of nationalism and populism (Gill, 2015; Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017); critical political economies of social conflict within a context of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2015); and political geography analyses of international relations theory (IRT), and more specifically critical geographies of peace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Flint, 2005; Koopman, 2016; McConnell, Megoran, & Williams, 2014; Megoran, 2011; Nagle, 2010; Williams & McConnell, 2011). Elaborating upon these, I contend that the methodological nationalism of the disciplines of economics and international relations – in which much of the liberal view is based – has left them in a sorry state in making sense of recent political development throughout the world, specifically when addressing the contemporary rise of reactionary forms of populism. In this sense, the high degrees of violence and vulnerability associated with processes of market integration have often escaped the radars of economics and IR analyses, fixated as they are with mono-scale scrutiny of national economies and state-to-state relations. Although some liberal IR scholars have laid the grounds for a less normative paradigm that incorporates domestic variables and bottom-up societal processes into the understanding of state action, the assumption remains that policy interdependence and compatibility between states, combined with the Pareto-efficient outcomes of globally integrated production and trade, result in ‘strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict’ (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 521; see also Oneal & Russett, 1997; McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). Recent developments suggest there are fundamental flaws with this largely deductive hypothesis. Whereas on aggregate terms, and according to some measurements, nation-states may have benefitted more or less from globalization, social conflict occurring at multiple scales – and indeed in a class-based dimension – is an undeniable constitutive element of state action, the latter reflecting and/or attempting to contain particular constellations of social forces and their interests. In this way, the damage inflicted upon many by increasingly disembedded markets and post-political states that shield policy from popular deliberation (both the products of the liberal agenda) are at the very root of the current crisis of liberal hegemony (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). In what follows, I draw upon a variety of cases to explain how a dialectical approach to liberalism, neoliberalism and their illiberal responses,1 and a multi-scalar analysis of market violence are indispensable in explaining much of the turbulence that world politics faces today. To be clear, the paper’s goal is not to deny that state leaders factor in the economic repercussions of conflict when they contemplate its possibility – a logical assumption of liberal international relations scholarship. The aim is instead to argue that these calculations tell very little about the nature of peace and conflict as historically bounded processes that need to be studied in relation to broader transformations in the global political economy, the latter affecting state behaviour in terms of both economic policy and inter-state rivalry. In this way, and crucially, I also wish to refute the liberal argument that the pursuit of economic integration at any (social) cost will unequivocally lower the prospects for international conflict or, indeed, structural violence more broadly understood as a multi-scalar phenomenon. The paper is structured as follows. The next section problematizes the concept of peace in IRT, with a more detailed discussion of economic liberalism. The following section presents a temporal critique, contextualizing the contemporary rise of illiberal politics within the transformation of the global political economy under world market capitalism. After this, I build upon Agnew (1994) to develop a scalar critique and argue that liberalism’s methodological nationalism hampers a proper assessment of the transnational dimensions of processes such as development, violence or peace. I chart various scales of market-induced violence and vulnerability (as a form of economic violence) in the global era, tracing the rescaling of violence and risk from the interstate scale to the individual sphere. I conclude by discussing the transition from a ‘durable disorder’ (Cerny, 1998) to an emerging (albeit contested) new populist order under world market capitalism. To do so, I echo Polanyi and Marx in contending that processes of marketization, replete as they are with contradiction, cannot engender liberal or capitalist peace, but result instead in anti-liberal reactions of various kinds (what Polanyi called ‘counter movements’) to the violence of unrestrained markets. Importantly, these counter movements can often take reactionary characteristics, as people under threat or the perception of threat retreat into culture and nationalism against the ‘other’ and internationalism in all its variants. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE LIBERAL PEACE While the pursuit of peace is a central preoccupation for progressive IR scholarship, peace as a concept and as an actual manifestation is rarely discussed in the IR literature. Instead, peace often appears as a negative occurrence, intuitively understood as the avoidance of war or an absence of overt inter-state violence (Galtung, 1969; Richmond, 2016, p. 57). Thereby, most IR literature focuses on the challenges to state-based peace, with commentary typically dominated by the two main competing schools, realism and liberalism, both subdivided into further dissenting subcamps. Conventional realist approaches take the ‘anarchic’ or violent nature of international politics as a given and place their focus on states’ survival strategies. Offensive realists warn of the disruptive effects of ‘power transitions’ and in the contemporary context claim, for example, that as China grows economically and militarily, and as its interests expand and it seeks greater influence, tensions with other countries are certain to arise (Mearsheimer, 2014). Defensive neorealists hold similar assumptions about the foundations of the international system, yet contend that states privilege security over domination and that the incentives for conflict are contingent rather than endemic, with balances of power potentially keeping states at bay and preventing conflict (Waltz, 1979). Liberal theorists dispute these interpretations and reject that competition alone guides state behaviour. Elaborating on the Kantian ideal of ‘perpetual peace’, and drawing upon Adam Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill, liberal theories contend that economic integration and institutional enmeshment or socialization exercise a constraining force on conflict and are conductive to peaceful scenarios (Doyle, 1986; Howard, 1981; Johnston, 2008; Keohane & Nye, 1977). While there is no absolute agreement on the exact shape that such ‘interdependence’ should take (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001), liberal IR scholars often hold that large-scale conflict in the 21st century can be avoided if the liberal world order survives the relative decline of the United States and manages to assimilate rising powers such as China. The emphasis is placed both on institutions and norms of reciprocity, on the one hand, and on economic integration, on the other. Regarding the latter, and evoking Smithian language, the agenda for a ‘capitalist peace’ assumes that free markets represent ‘“a hidden hand” that  …  build(s) up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states’ (Gartzke, 2007; Richmond, 2008, p. 23), and that ‘put simply, globalisation promotes peace’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003, p. 562). The theory is in many ways deductive, but relies also on the statistical data that on aggregate tends partially to support the liberal peace argument (except for the period leading to the First World War; see also Barbieri, 1996) and on the ‘logic’ that national leaders are not expected to act irrationally or be insensitive ‘to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors’ (Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010, p. 772). A more nuanced exposition of the liberal argument suggests that what brings nations together and heightens the opportunity cost of conflict is market integration according to a set of commonly devised regulations – rather than the realization of an ideal ‘free’ trade archetype (Moravcsik, 2005). This results in a sort of ‘embedded liberalism’, with the successful integration of post-Soviet states and China in world market capitalism through World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and other liberalizing initiatives understood as a deterrent to military action and, hence, as an effective strategy for both global growth and security, particularly in the face of China’s rising economic and military might (Funabashi, Oksenberg, & Weiss, 1994). From this perspective, not only is violence avoidable but also peace may indeed be engineered with the creation of a world market society being key to this endeavour as well as to the broader goal of crafting a liberal hegemony able to deliver a veritable ‘end of history’ where markets and functioning liberal democracies prevail (Fukuyama, 1992). The engineering of market-orientated democracies has indeed often been the main task of liberal peace- and state-building operatives in post-conflict areas (Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011). Yet, decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization. Across the world, liberal market integration has facilitated convivial relations among key countries and paid important dividends to elites, yet it has also resulted in the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands, rising inequalities within countries (although not between them) and higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as the logic of market competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives (Anand & Segal, 2015; Lynch, 2006). The relation between the United States and China or the processes of economic integration in the European Union are clear examples of these trends. In these places as well as others, inequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to a populist and nationalist momentum that can be interpreted both as a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). By prescribing ever more market globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population in the first place. Thereby, it is crucial to understand how the argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines.2 Two of the underlying problems in the liberal peace argument stand out. The first has to do with the statistical selection of fixed points in time that suggest correlations between growth in trade and diminished conflict – while failing to discern mechanisms of causation (Hayes, 2012). A wider temporal lens is needed to situate the contemporary rise of mercantilist and illiberal politics in the context of neoliberal globalization, representing the same sort of ‘counter movement’ that Polanyi had warned of in his reading of the 19th-century downward spiral towards war – aided in our contemporary case by the demise of the traditional left (Blyth & Matthijs, 2017; Carroll & Gonzalez-Vicente, 2017). The second problem relates to liberal international political economy and IRT’s scalar fixation on inter-state matters and hence their inability to factor in violence in the absence of war. I turn now to these two points. NEOLIBERALISM’S ILLIBERAL MOMENT AS COUNTER MOVEMENT On paper, the two intertwined arguments for liberal peace would seem to make sense: if countries remove the barriers to trade and investment and choose to specialize in their comparative advantages, international productivity will be raised and we will enjoy a more prosperous global economy with satisfied consumers and states; also, if states develop close economic linkages, they will have important material incentives to avoid conflict with one another. In the real world, competition between jurisdictions and social groups implies often that the development and prosperity of some is based on the exploitation and vulnerability of others, as typically emphasized by the extensive literature on bifurcated economies, temporally constrained and contradictory growth patterns, and uneven and destructive forms of development. In this way, it is not that economic interdependence, when removed from its social context and put under the microscope, does not raise the costs of conflict. However, the political choices and social transformations needed to achieve interdependence are a key variable to understanding a state’s behaviour and predisposition to conflict. And while governments may in many junctures align with the interests of capital, they are not immune to crises of legitimacy, and will need to mediate issues of accumulation and social cohesion when people perceive the social transformations required to achieve interdependence to have a negative impact on their lives (Jessop, 2016, p. 189). This will reflect in a way or another on state behaviour as political elites, current and prospective, jostle for votes and/or legitimacy. A key problem with the argument for liberal peace lies in its emphasis on narrow temporal correlations between trade and (lack of) conflict, which removes interdependence from its broader political economic context, disembedding peace and conflict from the broader set of historically bounded and politically contingent social relations that underpin them. A widened analytical timeframe renders clear the dialectical relationship between (neo)liberal social projects and their social responses, both progressive and reactionary. Whereas high volumes of trade may coincide at a particular ‘optimal’ period of liberal expansionism with interstate peace, they may also transform societies in ways that engender the conditions for a potential ‘illiberal’ turn or counter movement resulting in a higher risk of conflict as beggar-thy-neighbour positions emerge and new enemies need to be sought by political elites to bind national-constrained constituencies to their agendas to maintain power. We can observe this temporal incongruity in the work of some of the key proponents of the capitalist peace. For example, Oneal and Russett (1999, p. 439) argue that trade ‘sharply reduces the onset of or involvement in militarized disputes among contiguous and major-power pairs’, which are identified by Maoz and Russett (1993) as the set of countries more likely to enter into conflict with each other. Despite Oneal and Russett’s sophisticated approach to the data (modelling, for example, to avoid ‘false negatives’ by factoring in geographic contiguity, or controlling for alliances) and the attention paid to statistical rejections of the liberal peace argument, trade interdependence and the occurrence of conflict are analyzed on a year-by-year basis (Oneal & Russett, 1999, p. 428). This is also the case with other comparable studies (Hegre, 2000; Oneal & Russett, 2001; Souva & Prins, 2006). This temporal frame is problematic, as inter-national conflict tends to build up over prolonged periods of time, and the adverse impacts of interdependence and liberal integration are more likely to result first in crisis and social dislocation, followed by some sort of economic distancing (perhaps under a new administration that replaces the one that embraced liberalization) and a wide range of policy measures, before leading to military conflict – underpinned either by the state that perceives that liberal integration is having negative impacts on socioeconomic development, or more often than not by the one which wants to prevent the deterioration of important trade and investment links. Here, one vital issue often left out of the liberal peace equations is the fact that most military interventions in the post-Second World War period were aimed at disciplining countries that opted out of the United States’ global liberalizing project and sought to pursue a variety of indigenous pathways to modernity, often including many that did so under the rubric of socialism, democratically achieved or otherwise. The reverse is also true, as countries that chose to ally with the United States during the Cold War were shielded from attacks, and in some cases given preferential trade access, technology transfer and allowed to engage in market protection. In this context, associating conflict with the lack of strong trade links, rather than to the meticulous unfolding of a market-based imperial agenda, would be tantamount to concluding that low opium consumption was responsible for British military expeditions in 19th-century China. While there is certainly a correlation between China’s ban on opium and British intervention, nobody could seriously suggest that opium consumption reduces interstate conflict. Similarly, in many of these cases, it is not that the absence of trade results in conflict, but on the contrary, that military intervention has often been aimed at expanding markets and protecting investment.

#### 5---Trade causes deforestation.

Tetsuya and Shunsuke 11

Tsurumi Tetsuya (Nanzan University) and Managi Shunsuke (Tohuku University). “The Effect of Trade Openness on Deforestation: Empirical Analysis for 142 Countries.” December 30th, 2011. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35805/1/MPRA\_paper\_35805.pdf

Next, we consider the trade-induced composition effect. Table 5 shows that compared with the trade-induced scale-technique effect, the trade-induced composition effect is relatively large. In particular, we obtain relatively large elasticities for σ DTC . We are able to determine how an increase in trade intensity affects composition effects through both the KLE and the ERE by evaluating the sign of σ DTC , which is negative for OECD but positive for non-OECD countries. In the case of pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, with increases in trade intensity, a country that has a comparative advantage in capital-intensive products (i.e., pollution-intensive products) is likely to increase its 21 emissions by specializing more in these products (see Managi et al., 2009). However, in the case of the forest industry, a country that is labor-intensive is likely to have a comparative advantage, and thus, with trade intensity increased, **developing countries seem to accelerate deforestation by specializing more in such products** (i.e., the KLE). At the same time, developing countries have relatively lax environmental policies (i.e., the ERE), which seems to explain why the signs of σ DTC for non-OECD countries are positive. In the same manner, we can interpret the signs of σ DTC for OECD countries.13 Because the trade-induced composition effects dominate the trade-induced scale-technique effects for all cases in Table 5, the obtained signs of the overall trade-induced elasticities are all the same as those of trade-induced composition effects. 5.2 Robustness check We have obtained **statistically significant results** concerning trade, a finding that is inconsistent with previous studies. To check the robustness of our results, we apply semi-parametric analysis. In this study, we use generalized additive models (see Hastie 13 Because the sample averages of RS and RKL are larger than 1 in OECD countries and are less than 1 in non-OECD countries, we see that developed countries have a comparative advantage in capital-intensive production and enforce relatively strict environmental policies. Meanwhile, developing countries have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive production and have relatively lax environmental policies. 22 and Tibshirani, 1990). We use a cubic spline smoothing14 iteratively to minimize the partial residuals, which are the residuals after removing the influence of the other variables in the model. In this model, a Bayesian approach is used to derive standard errors and confidence intervals.15 The model is as follows: it it 4 1 2 3 4 4 4 ( ) / (( ) ) ( ) it i t it it D c f predicted S f K L f predicted T = + + + + + + µ ν ε , (12) where it predicted S denotes predicted values of GDP per capita (constructed using equation (2)), and Tit predicted denotes predicted values of Trade openness (constructed from the gravity equation). We use predicted values to consider simultaneous problems. f (⋅) are generic flexible functional forms that allow potentially non-linear non-monotonic relationships.16 µi is the country fixed effect, ν t is the time fixed effect, and it ε is the error term.17 Table 6 shows the results of the model fit test. We find that all terms are statistically significant. Fig. 2 shows the predicted contributions to the dependent 14 When we used the loess function in place of the cubic spline function, the results were almost the same. 15 Our estimation technique follows Wood (2004, 2008). 16 We use the normal distribution for estimation. The link function is the identity. 17 We include country dummy and year dummy to take into consideration individual and time fixed effects. 23 variable from each of the independent variables. As a result, the estimated slope of the predicted trade openness has an increasing trend. This suggests that deforestation tends to occur with increasing trade openness. Next, although the confidence interval is large, the slope of capital-labor ratio tends to be negative. This trend also corresponds to our parametric estimation results, supporting our hypothesis that the forest industry tends to be labor-intensive. Finally, we find a positive slope for GDP per capita, although the confidence interval is large. This trend also corresponds to our parametric estimation results for the scale-technique effect. 6.

#### Extinction.

Dominik Goldstein 16, “Eliminating deforestation and forest degradation in order to prevent species from extinction, especially with regard to areas in Asia, Africa and South America,” <http://www.balmun.de/fileadmin/2016/Research_Reports/RR_EC_I_Deforestation.pdf>

Deforestation and forest degradation are undoubtedly part of the largest environmental problems our world is facing today. Of the 16 million square kilometers of forest that once covered the earth’s surface, only 6.2 million remain up to date. 2.3 million have been destroyed between 2000 and 2012 alone. Not only does this threaten the balance of local important environmental factors such as water cycles and greenhouse gas decomposition and harm the economy and society of affected areas, but it also endangers many different species, as 80% of all biodiversity is found in forests. The entire planet and its population rely on the fate of forests, it is vital that the issues of deforestation and forest degradation are tackled thoroughly, however, it can only be achieved through close cooperation amongst all UN member nations.

### 1NC---AT: Clean Tech

#### Renewables increase warming---rebound effect overwhelms efficiency gains.

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5. Efficiency and the Rebound Effect

The poor historical record of decoupling reviewed above is counter-intuitive, perhaps, because one might ordinarily think that efficiency gains would lead to substantial reductions in energy and resource demands. In other words, it is plausible to think that as the world gets better at producing commodities more efficiently, the absolute impacts of our economic activity would naturally decline. But we have seen that this assumption has not played out in reality. In part this is due to sheer growth in economic throughput and energy services, which has overwhelmed the efficiency gains that have been made. But another critical part of the explanation is due to what are known as ‘rebound effects’ (Alcott, 2005; Polimeni et al, 2009; Saunders, 2013). A rebound effect is said to have occurred when the benefits of efficiency improvements are partially or wholly negated by consumption growth – either by consumers or by industry – that was made possible by the efficiency improvements (Herring and Sorrell, 2009; Alcott and Madlener, 2009). For example, a 5% increase in energy efficiency may only reduce energy consumption by 2% if the efficiency improvements incentivise consumers or industry to increase demand for energy (meaning 60% of anticipated savings are lost or ‘taken back’). In other words, efficiency improvements can provoke behavioural or economic responses (‘rebounds’) that end up reducing some of the anticipated benefits of the efficiency improvements. When those rebounds are significant enough they can even lead to increased resource or energy consumption, which is sometimes called ‘back-fire’ or the ‘Jevons paradox,’ in reference to the classical economist William Stanley Jevons who first observed the phenomena. There are two main categories of rebound effects – direct rebounds and indirect rebound.

A direct rebound occurs when an efficiency gain in production results in increased consumption of the same resource (Khazzoom, 1980; Frondel et al., 2012). For example, a more fuel-efficient car can lead people to drive more often, or drive further, since the costs of fuel per kilometre have gone down; a more efficient heater can lead people to warm their houses for longer periods or to hotter temperatures, since the relative costs of heating have gone down; energy efficient lighting can lead people to leave the lights on for longer, etc. (Sorrell, 2009). Similar dynamics operate in industry whereby the introduction of more energy efficiency methods either reduces the price of a commodity (since it makes production less resource-intensive or time-intensive), or else enables the development of new product lines, thus acting to incentivise higher consumption, meaning that some or all the efficiency gains are lost.

An indirect rebound occurs when efficiency gains lead to increased consumption of some other resource. For example, insulating one’s home might reduce the annual consumption of energy for electricity, but the money saved from reduced energy costs is often spent on other commodities that require energy (e.g., a plane flight or a new computer). This can mean that some, or all the energy saved from insulating one’s house is consumed elsewhere, meaning overall energy dependence can stay the same or even increase.

While the basic mechanism of rebound effects is widely acknowledged, and, indeed, beyond dispute, there is an ongoing debate over the magnitude of the various rebound phenomena (Chakravarty et al., 2013). There is, however, a strong body of literature arguing that the rebound effect is larger than has been previously assumed (Sorrell, 2015; Sanders, 2013). Saunders (2013), for example, finds that there was an average direct energy rebound (thus excluding potential indirect rebound) of 62% across 30 sectors of U.S industry from 1980 to 2000. Without entering further into the intricacies of the complex empirical and theoretical debates, it is fair to say that despite the uncertainties, there is broad agreement that rebound effects exist and that they are significant. The benefits of technology are almost always less than presumed, and, in fact, at times efficiency improvements can lead to more, not fewer, resources being consumed overall.

6. The ‘Growth Model’ Has No Techno-Fix

The forgoing lines of argument should be enough to cast doubt on the faith of the techno-optimists. But faith dies hard, even in the face of compelling evidence. Thus, the techno-optimist is likely to double down and proclaim that past behaviour is not a reliable guide to future success. As Nordhaus and Shellenberger (2011) argue: ‘The solution to the unintended consequences of modernity is, and has always been, more modernity – just as the solution to the unintended consequences of our technologies has always been more technology.’ While this can be accepted as a theoretical possibility, there are dynamics at play – including the laws of physics – that suggest that decoupling through efficiency gains will not reduce the overall ecological impacts of economic activity if global growth remains the primary economic goal (Ward et al, 2016).

This uncomfortable reality was highlighted by a recent study (Ward et al, 2016), which extrapolated out the implication of Australia pursuing economic growth at the modest rate (by historical standards) of 2.41% per annum each year until the end of the 21st century. The study assumed rapid technological development and proactive policy settings (i.e. a steeply rising global carbon price), resulting in historically unprecedented energy and resource efficiency gains. Nevertheless, given that by 2100 the Australian economy would have undergone an eightfold expansion, the study found that by 2100 Australian material and energy use, instead of declining, would have risen by 29 per cent and 256 per cent respectively on current levels (Ward et al; 9). The authors conclude that this demonstrates ‘categorically that GDP growth cannot be sustained indefinitely’ (Ward et al 2016; 10).

Even this scenario, however, understates the true magnitude of the challenge for those advocating techno-optimism. First, these scenarios assume that efficiency gains will be just as easy to achieve in coming decades as they have in the past. But this assumption is highly questionable, given the reality of diminishing returns from investment, which we are already witnessing today, and which are likely to accelerate as ecological conditions deteriorate. This is most obvious with respect to the resource sector, which includes, of course, fossil fuels accounting for over 80 per cent of the global economy’s primary energy (IEA, 2017). For basic economic reasons, humans tend to extract the cheapest and easiest resources first while leaving the more difficult, dangerous and expensive resources for later. What this means is that, over coming decades, the energy and financial costs of resource extraction will tend to rise. Indeed, this trend is already apparent; several decades ago, for example, the energy in one barrel of oil could be used to extract 30 barrels of oil, but the ratio is now estimated to be around 18 and the ratio will only decrease in coming decades (Hall et al, 2014). The impact of depletion is also evident in the mining sector with declining mineral ore grades and increasing mining waste rock and tailings resulting in higher energy, water and emission costs for mining and ore separation (Mudd, 2009). The upshot is that, even if there are rapid efficiency gains in, say, manufacturing processes, in coming decades they are likely to be increasingly counteracted by efficiency declines in resource extraction. This situation evokes the challenge faced by the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, who must run faster and faster simply to stay in the same place (Likvern, 2012).

# 2NC

## Adv 2---Maritime Industry

Then do Russia china debates

Defense and turns case floating

Then transition

Sustainability

## Axis

#### Baltic conflict goes nuclear.

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While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons.

First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance.

Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland.

Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond.

Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly.

Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments.

Sixth, both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments.

Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours.

Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers.

The bottom line is that all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.

#### SCS war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil.

A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think.

Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.”

This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power.

China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.

#### Cyber-attacks go nuclear.

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Information Warfare Could Lead to Escalation

Machine learning, big data analytics, and sensing technologies, supported by 5G networks, could alert commanders of incoming threats with increased speed and precision. This could result in fewer accidents in the sensitive command and control environment. However, this technological coalescence will also amplify risks of escalation in two ways: First, AI machine learning used as a force multiplier for cyber offense — e.g., data poisoning spoofing, deepfakes, manipulation, hacking, and digital jamming — would be considerably more difficult to detect, especially if an attacker used advanced persistent threat tools in the spectrum-contested environment. Second, in the unlikely event that an attack was successfully detected, threat identification (or attribution) at machine speed would be virtually impossible. In short, the key security challenge lies not in making more convincing fakes, but in detecting the spread of false information.

AI machine learning techniques might also exacerbate the escalation risks by manipulating the digital information landscape, where decisions about the use of nuclear weapons are made. Given current tensions between the United States and other nuclear powers — China, Russia, and North Korea — it is possible to imagine unprovoked escalation caused by a malicious third-party (or state-proxy) clandestine action.

During a crisis, the inability of a state to determine an attacker’s intent may lead an actor to conclude that an attack (threatened or actual) was intended to undermine its nuclear deterrent. For example, an AI-enabled, third-party-generated deepfake, coupled with data-poisoning cyber attacks, could spark an escalatory crisis between two (or more) nuclear states.

As demonstrated at a recent workshop hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, malign manipulation of input data received by early-warning systems might not only subvert the output of AI systems in a specific situation, but also undermine the reliability of an entire algorithm network environment if executed during the program’s training phase.

Consider the following fictional scenarios, in which the use of deepfakes and spoofing by nefarious third-party, non-state, or state-proxy actors triggers unintentional and unprovoked escalation.

Fictional Example #1: Deepfakes

To incite conflict between two rival states, State A uses proxy hackers to launch deepfake video or audio material, which depicts senior military commanders of State B conspiring to launch a preemptive strike on State C. Then, this deepfake footage is deliberately leaked into State C’s AI-augmented intelligence collection and analysis systems, provoking State C to escalate the situation with strategic consequences. State B responds to the threat of preemption with a retaliatory strike.

Escalation in this case would, of course, be deliberate. Thus, increased escalation risk as a result of technology is not always inadvertent or accidental. For example, escalation risks caused by the aggressive U.S.-Soviet expansion of counterforce technology during the Cold War reflected shifting nuclear doctrines on both sides (i.e., away from assured mutual destruction), not the pursuit of these technologies themselves. Moreover, AI technology could enable an adversary to pursue a predetermined escalatory path. In fact, AI may be developed precisely for this purpose.

Fictional Example #2: Spoofing

State A launches a malicious AI-enhanced cyber attack to spoof State B’s AI-enabled autonomous sensor platforms and automated target recognition systems, in such a way that the weapon system (a human-supervised automated target recognition system) is fooled into interpreting a civilian object (a commercial airliner, for example) as a military target. State B, based on subverted information and the inability of human supervisors to detect the spoofed imagery in time to take corrective action, accidentally (and unintentionally) escalates the situation.

In this example, the spoofing attack on the weapon systems’ algorithm is executed in such a way that the imagery appears to the recognition system as indistinguishable from a valid military target, escalating the situation based on a false premise that would be unlikely to fool the human eye. AI experts have proven that even when data appears accurate to AI image recognition software, these systems often hallucinate objects that do not exist.

The explainability (or “black box”) problem associated with AI applications may further compound these dynamics. Insufficient understanding of how and why AI algorithms reach a particular judgment or decision would complicate the task of determining if datasets had been deliberately compromised to manufacture false outcomes — such as attacking incorrect targets or misdirecting allies during combat.

Furthermore, as humans and AI team up to accomplish particular missions, the opacity associated with how AI systems reach a decision may cause an operator to have either too much or too little confidence in a system’s performance.

Consequently, unless the system’s machine learn­ing algorithm is terminated, once deployed at the end of the training phase it could potentially learn something it was not intended to, or even perform a task or mission that its human designers do not expect it to do. This issue is one of the main reasons why the use of AI machine learning in the context of weapon systems is, for now, confined to mostly experimental research.

Even if nuclear early-warning systems might eventually detect the subversion, heightened levels of uncertainty and tension caused by an alert may impel the respective militaries to put their nuclear weapons on high alert status. This skewed assessment in the context of nuclear weapons, ready to launch at a moment’s notice, would likely precipitate worst-case scenario thinking that may spark inadvertent escalation.

Therefore, AI-augmented cyber intelligence gathering tools (or espionage) used during a crisis could easily be misinterpreted by an adversary as a prelude for a preemptive attack on its nuclear force.

#### Pursuing heg pushes Russia and China into alignment---it gives them a mutual interest in offsetting Western supremacy.

Hawn 18, Analyst at Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm. (Jeff, 12-10-2018, "China, Russia and the formation of an 'Eastern Entente'", *The Hill*, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/420664-china-russia-and-the-formation-of-an-eastern-entente)

Indeed, if one weighs Russia and China’s mutual interest versus their mutual animosities, an argument begins to form that the two Eurasian powers’ conflict with the West may be enough to overcome their history of distrust.

First, and perhaps most important is that neither power poses an existential threat to the other. Russia is not looking to convert China to its government system and the same goes for China. Any competition between the two states is framed in the realist sense of great power competition over land and resources. The West meanwhile actively espouses its own democratic system as a superior form of government, and has spent the last three quarters of a century trying to spread its ideals across the world.

Secondly, there is the issue of territorial integrity. While it is true that Russia and China share a massive land border, that border sits at the far frontier of both nations. In contrast, both China and Russia have American troops within easy striking distance of their centers of power. In Europe, American tanks stationed in the Baltic States sit about 385 miles from Moscow. In the Pacific, the US 7th Fleet is based in Japan in addition to thousands of American troops deployed in Korea. These military assets are well within striking distance of China’s seaboard, the heart of its economy, and home to the majority of its population. Both Russia and China view the U.S. and its allies as attempting to constrain their respective efforts to secure regions of strategic significance for them.

China and Russia’s similarities do not end there. Both nations are former imperial powers that see themselves as the victims over extended periods of national humiliation forced on them by the Western powers. When that is taken into consideration, the two nations’ desire to cooperate begins to makes sense.

So what do Russia and China have to gain from increased cooperation? Is their ultimate goal dominion over the United States, as some alarmists would have us believe? I do not believe so. Both states are the heirs to the most brutal school of realpolitik. Their goal in cooperating is to offset the U.S. global hegemony, and carve out spheres of influence that will boost their own security and economic growth.

Neither nation will benefit from a complete U.S. retreat form the world stage, but both have much to gain if they can challenge U.S. supremacy. Indeed, there remain strong points of contention between Russia and China, especially the Central Asian states in Russia’s traditional backyard, which China has increasingly been playing in as part of its One Belt One Road initiative. However, it can be argued that in Central Asia we are seeing the most tangible result of Chinese and Russia entente. Both can benefit from the region’s development, while security and counter terrorism cooperation help to prop up friendly regimes, and keep the lid on potential jihadist threats a serious concern for both states.

There are already strong signs that China and Russia are seeing the benefits of working together. The two nations militaries frequently hold joint exercises, most notably Vostok 2018 when 3,500 Chinese troops participated in the exercises. Economic investment has lagged behind, but both China and Russia have recently signaled a desire to boost the economic heft of their shared border region. The nascent Russian-Chinese Business Advisory Committee announced in September 2018 an ambitious goal of a cumulative $100 billion joint investment and development projects.

There certainly will be tension between the two states. Vostok was marred by reports of Russian naval vessels being followed by a Chinese spy ship, and Russian state media printed several critical articles of the Chinese J-15, which is derived from Soviet technology purchased from Ukraine. These spats should not distract from the broader trend that is unfolding, both nations’ security dilemmas on their respective eastern and western flanks. Dilemmas made more pressing by U.S. sanctions and tariffs. The ability to, if not trust their neighbor, at least trust that for the moment their interests are aligned has helped the China- Russia entente build momentum.

As the U.S. and Western animosity grows toward Russia and China, it will continue to push them to closer cooperation, and make rending their partnership far more difficult. Between 1972 and 1990, U.S. grand strategy called for counterbalancing these two powers. At the time both states had more to gain through engagement with the U.S. than they did with each other. Over the last two decades, that has reversed substantially. So perhaps the question should not be if China and Russia would form an alliance, but whether or not they already have, and how strong it can grow?

#### Heg causes a formal alliance.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, *International Politics*; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 1. The continuation of the Sino-Russian entente It is quite likely that, even seven or 10 years into the future, the forces that currently sustain the Moscow–Beijing axis will remain in place or could even intensify. Russia and China’s rivalry with the USA could grow more acute, while their illiberal autocracies would become even more entrenched. This will result in the continuation of the Sino-Russian entente, with ever tighter political, ideological, military and economic ties between Moscow and Beijing, and could even see the elevation of their ‘strategic partnership’ to the level of a full alliance based on a formal treaty.

#### The impact is about coordination, not an alliance---that’s possible and sparks war.

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4. Deepening relations between Russia and China will be among the most significant U.S. foreign policy challenges in the coming decade.

Russia and China are unlikely to forge a formal military alliance. But even short of such an alliance, their growing alignment and coordination will present a significant challenge for U.S. national security in the coming years. The Director of National Intelligence warned in his 2019 Annual Threat Assessment that strengthening ties between China and Russia will present a “wide variety of economic, political, counterintelligence, military, and diplomatic challenges to the United States and its allies.”5 If Russia-China relations continue to grow, it would harm U.S. interests by enhancing their mutual capabilities and stretching U.S. capabilities, complicating U.S. strategic planning by potentially dividing U.S. power, emboldening them to act knowing they will have each other’s support, enhancing the perceived legitimacy of the alternative they provide, and diluting U.S leverage over countries willing to play the United States off Russia and China.6 Russia and China are also poised to challenge U.S. interests through the complementarity of their actions.7 Russia and China take different approaches to pursuing their foreign policy objectives. Russian foreign policy is confrontational and brazen. So far, China has used a subtler and more risk-averse strategy, preferring stability that is conducive to building economic ties and influence. Although their tactics are different, they have the potential to converge in synergistic ways such that the combined effects on U.S. interests is greater than the sum of their individual efforts. This dynamic is most evident in Europe, but there is potential for greater synergies between Russia and China to create new challenges for the United States.

#### Coordination alone is strong enough to be a “game changer”.

Sakwa, 19 — Richard Sakwa a Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent, and an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, and has written several, many books on this topic of Russia, Eurasia, and so forth. (5-8-2019; "Are the Days of U.S. Hegemony Finally Numbered?" *Truthdig*; https://www.truthdig.com/articles/are-the-days-of-u-s-hegemony-finally-numbered/)

The Russian-Chinese alignment is not an alliance, and it’s not a bloc, and it’s certainly not a military alliance, but the Russo-Chinese alignment is far deeper, far more extensive, and far more extensive than many Westerners have yet caught on. It’s an alignment in which Russia and China will not do each other any harm, they will support each other when it’s in their interests, and it’s a game changer. This is Kissinger in reverse. As you remember, in the early 1970s, Kissinger brilliantly managed to exploit the split between Moscow and Beijing to United States’ advantage. Today, the Beijing-Moscow alignment—not an axis, not an alliance—is far deeper. And when Trump came to power, he had, I think, a sensible idea, which was, I think, given to him by Kissinger to try to peel Russia away from this alignment with China, and to align Russia more closely with the United States. Of course, he was blocked in this because of Russiagate and various scandals, US domestic politics. And so, the exact opposite has happened, that this Belt and Road forum just recently demonstrated just how close Russia and China have become.

## Global Governance

## Russia

## China

## Turns Case

### T/ Case

#### \*Turns their impacts:

#### \*Turns warming

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At the moment, confrontation with China might seem to offer something for everyone, much as the anti-Soviet crusade initially promised. In the late 1940s, businesses saw an opportunity to expand trade and secure capitalism; organized labor signed on, agreeing to discipline its ranks for a slice of the economic pie. It seemed like a good bargain, at least until growth stalled and the Cold War turned out to mean dying in Vietnam.

The costs were immense then, and they could be steeper now. For one, it is no coincidence that a president who denies climate change is leading the charge against China, the top emitter of greenhouse gases. Arresting climate change requires America and China to cooperate and channel their competition into salvaging the planet rather than seizing its resources. The American people can live with an authoritarian China. They cannot live on an uninhabitable Earth.

Nor should the American people fear a Chinese military attack. Even in East Asia, Chinese forces are not about to displace American ones. The United States has time to assess China’s ambitions and encourage its neighbors to defend themselves. Unremitting hostility may prove self-fulfilling, inducing China to seek to oust the United States military from the region. Although some think containing China offers a rationale for leaving the Middle East, they should think ahead: A new cold war could plunge the United States back into gruesome proxy wars around the world and risk a still deadlier war among the great powers.

#### \*Pursuing heg causes illiberal populism---financial strain, xenophobia, and welfare cuts.

Blagden & Porter 21, \*David, Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Exeter, \*\*Patrick, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. (2-21-2021, “Desert Shield of the Republic? A Realist Case for Abandoning the Middle East”, *Security Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2021.1885727, pg. 33-37) \*typo corrected---brackets

Embroilment in the Middle East damages America’s republic, its institutions, and the wider health of its civic life. More than Europe or Asia, the pursuit of Middle Eastern hegemony in its current condition, which shows no sign of easing, damages democracy at home. Not only is the region volatile, violently contested, and difficult to stabilize. It is also where the interests of the superpower and its clients are most misaligned.

America’s wars in the Middle East contribute to the coarsening and corruption of its public life and politics. While division and disagreement are inherent to democracy, some forms of polarization threaten a republic’s survival, if political actors reject mutual tolerance and their opponents’ legitimacy. Two decades of conflict in the name of combating global terrorism and defeating alien enemies accentuated the rise of an unhealthy, xenophobic, and paranoid populism. By “populism,” we mean specifically a politics that is not only critical of elites, but a politics that is an antipluralist, authoritarian form of identitarian division, pitting a virtuous people against illegitimate “non-people,” outsiders and elites, propagating a violent intolerance.106

In particular, embroilment in disappointing wars in the Middle East contributed to Trump’s election to the presidency. Active-duty personnel [were] was twice as likely to choose Trump over Hillary Clinton. And as a recent study found, based on regression that controlled for alternative explanatory variables, there is “a significant and meaningful relationship between a community’s rate of military sacrifice and its support for Trump … if three states key to Trump’s victory—Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin— had suffered even a modestly lower casualty rate, all three could have flipped from red to blue and sent Hillary Clinton to the White House.” 107 Other studies, likewise, suggest a causal linkage between rates of military sacrifice and voting behavior.108 Military communities represent important votes in the electoral college, in Sunbelt states such as South Carolina and Florida, and in Rust Belt states suffering deindustrialization such as Ohio and Pennsylvania. An aggrieved constituency of military veterans and their families and friends has formed, after bearing the brunt of America’s wars. Two-thirds of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans now say the wars were not worth fighting.109 Military suicides average 20 per day, higher than the general population rate.110 The linkage is further suggested by the migration of significant amounts of military donations to Senator Bernie Sanders’s election campaigns, Sanders having denounced Trump for breaking his word about ending perpetual wars.111 There remains a constituency open to the appeal of candidates denouncing the failure of US hegemony and its wars in the Middle East, a constituency that could again support Trumpian-style populism, or perhaps something more destructive.112 Indeed, after the insurrection in Washington, D.C., in January 2021, veterans appear to have been overrepresented among the violent mob that sacked the Capitol building, with almost one in five of those prosecuted having served in the military.113 Of course, most veterans do not express dissatisfaction with the existing order in this way, and those among the mob may have had motives other than disaffection with intractable warfare, but the dangers are apparent.

Most realists look at this with regret. For those concerned that continuous war threatens the republic, Trump’s rise was a bad thing, because he is authoritarian114 and thus inimical to republican traditions that look to prevent excessive concentrations of power, and because he (and his administration) have been corrupt. According to Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, the United States under Trump’s presidency fell six places from 2017, reflecting the “erosion of ethical norms at the highest levels of power.” 115 The Trump administration’s corrupt practices include the selling of diplomatic posts, attacks on the freedom of the press (for instance, revoking the press credentials of inquisitive reporters), family profiteering on the state, and coercing Ukraine to investigate domestic political opponents by withholding military aid.

Some caveats are in order. First, the wars since 2001 and Trump’s opposition to liberal hegemony were not the only cause of his political ascent. Nonetheless, registered Trump voters ranked foreign policy high among their priorities, suggesting his broader message—of putting America first, ending other countries’ free-riding at its expense, and that a self-serving establishment had failed the country by involving it in endless war—resonated.116 Neither did the problem begin with him and his “America First” movement. Trump was a symptom and a result of an increasingly damaged public life, while also embodying and exploiting a political revolt against it. And regular military campaigns are not a necessary condition for these problems: states can fall prey to harmful populism without continuous war, just as someone can develop lung cancer without regularly smoking. But just as smoking’s correlation with lung cancer reflects a demonstrated causal relationship, so too is there a causal link between continuous war and a state’s political condition. It would be naive, of course, to argue that simply abandoning one region would swiftly cure all ills of Western domestic politics. But it would be a valuable exorcism of one of the most corrupting influences—not least because, although Trump himself may have lost the 2020’s presidential election to a restorationist candidate (Joe Biden), some variant of Trumpism looks set to remain a potent force in US politics for the foreseeable future.

Primacy realists, like liberal hawks, are strangely inattentive to the domestic, constitutional, and civic impact of hegemony on American life. Primacists who advocate more primacy, with increased defense spending purchased through reductions in collective provision (such as welfare entitlements and social security), betray a perverse attitude to means and ends. US hegemony and power projection become the end rather than the means to protecting US security interests and safeguarding a healthy civic life. The consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice.117 They assume the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power efficiently enough. The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission report, produced by a congressionally appointed bipartisan committee of national security experts, is a case in point. It takes dominance as America’s obvious national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, US military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars have eroded because of reduced defense expenditure, and advises that Washington spend yet more on military forces while further cutting entitlements.118 On this logic, a defense budget already ten times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s cannot be enough, for US grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to the achievement of unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is under-considered.

America’s recent and current posture toward the region, and its particular mode of war-making, has led to deficit-financed, capital-intensive, and protracted wars. In turn, this results in concentrations of power at odds with the founding principles of the Constitution. It damages the authority of Congress, which has helped marginalize itself in foreign affairs policymaking and in checking the exertions of the executive branch. A state of near-permanent war became institutionalized. The Patriot Act wrought an era of secret sites, extraordinary rendition and torture, extrajudicial assassinations on an industrial scale, and involvement in the aggression of client states, without the influence such involvement was supposed to generate. The apparatus of unaccountable, secretive powers stretched also to “national security letters,” exorbitant instruments of state power whereby the federal authorities can audit and investigate an individual while prohibiting them from seeking counsel or informing anyone.

This era of institutionalized war, with military activity of varying intensity across eighty countries, has also exacerbated inequality and social strain.119 The wars since 2001 were “credit card” wars, financed by borrowing, and fought by a volunteer military. This financing helped to secure political acquiescence by shifting immediate burdens away from most citizens.120 Consequences for the population still flowed. Wealthy individuals and institutions were able to enrich themselves by purchasing bonds, while all others must take on the fiscal burden of repaying the (increasingly vast) debt. Indirect taxes also are regressive, as increased sales, value-added, excise, and customs taxes fall more on low and middle-income households, for whom spending is a larger share of disposable income, just as various forms of inflation—another means of debt-servicing—most negatively affect that same demographic. The wars of the “market state,” which deploy grandiose rhetoric but impose burdens so inequitably, helped to entrench the oligarchic concentrations of wealth from which American civic life now suffers. Of course, America’s domestic political choice of a regressive taxation model is hardly the fault of its MENA allies. But the era of “forever war” centered on the greater Middle East, and the vast defense expenditure to which it contributes, explains a lot about why such taxes must be used so extensively while delivering so few domestic services to those who pay them. Furthermore, insofar as the United States has had to sell ever more debt abroad, facilitating the economic model (and associated industrialization strides) of a developing power such as China,121 this cycle of war and debt has contributed to both the rise of a US peer competitor and the decline of Western manufacturing. That, in turn, has eroded American working-class living standards, which is both a negative outcome on its own terms and a contributor to rising political polarization, populism, and strategic atrophy.

## Link

#### 1---1AC tag:

#### US commercial maritime and port infrastructure is collapsing now – wrecks American naval strength and overall hegemony- supporting US shipping industry is key

#### 2---1AC internal---says key to deter China, is a national security vulnerability, AND says it would force collapse---1NR will have theoretical reasons why you can’t no link impact turns post-1AC

**Greenwood and Miletello 11/4** (Jeremy Greenwood and Emily Miletello, Federal Executive Fellow - The Brookings Institution, Coast Guard Fellow - U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, THE Brookings Institute, “To expand the Navy isn’t enough. We need a bigger commercial fleet.”, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/11/04/to-expand-the-navy-isnt-enough-we-need-a-bigger-commercial-fleet/>, November 4, 2021)

With the United States drawing down in the Middle East and starting to realize the long-awaited “pivot to the Pacific,” **Chinese naval expansion and the troubling practices of Chinese distant-water fishing fleets have risen to the top of the list of global and national security concerns plaguing our top strategists. And while much has been written on Chinese military ambitions at sea, we seem to have forgotten Beijing’s commercial maritime activity, which has also increased dramatically, in terms of both shipbuilding and investments in port infrastructure around the globe.** **At the same time, the number of U.S. vessels engaged in global commerce has never been smaller. In the words of a senior official responsible for America’s sealift capability, this is no less than a “**screaming national security vulnerability.” America’s commercial fleet is languishing In the midst of negotiations surrounding one of the largest infrastructure spending bills in decades, there has been almost no serious discussion about the need to enhance our commercial sealift capabilities or to increase American shipbuilding capacity. Instead, America’s maritime infrastructure continues to be overlooked and our commercial fleet continues to fall behind those of our maritime competitors. **We have been prolific in building U.S. Navy warships, but have failed to invest even modestly in the civilian maritime industries that will support our warfighting capabilities.** Jeremy Greenwood Jeremy Greenwood The United States is an inherently maritime nation. Yet, U.S. flagged vessels make up only 0.4% of the world’s vessels (yes, that’s 0.4%, not 4%). As of July 2021, that’s about 180 ships out of a global fleet of more than 43,000. If you’ve ever sailed on a cruise ship, you likely were on a vessel registered in the Bahamas, Panama, or Liberia. **If you’ve ever looked out at any of America’s largest ports, you probably only saw vessels flying the flag of Panama, Marshall Islands, Hong Kong (which maintains a separate registry for now), or more than ever – China. Why many American ships don’t fly U.S. flags “Open registries” — a concept unique to global shipping — allow any ship owner to register its vessel in a nation with which it has practically no ties, to take advantage of low taxes, less regulation, and cheap labor. In the high-stakes and competitive world of global shipping, seeking out a cheaper flag state — often referred to as a “ flag of convenience” — can save a company millions. Starting with the first wave of globalization after World War II, “flags of convenience” quickly became a standard business practice in the shipping industry, removing almost any incentive to build and operate an American ship outside of the small market of those required to conduct domestic trade (the “Jones Act” fleet, which must, with limited exception, be U.S. crewed, owned, and registered). A consequence of this shift is that our nation lost much of its industrial capability to build, maintain and repair large ocean-going vessels, and with it, the large-scale training and education of U.S. Merchant Mariners.** The role of U.S. commercial ships in national security **Even with the world’s most dominant Navy, access to a U.S. flagged commercial fleet is critical to our national security. In a 1989 National Security Directive on Sealift (“sealift” is the use of cargo ships for military transport), the White House outlined the importance of maintaining a U.S.-flagged fleet, calling it “essential both to executing this country’s forward defense strategy and to maintaining a wartime economy” and necessary to build surge capacity to “ensure that sufficient military and civil maritime resources will be available to meet defense deployment and essential economic requirements in support of our national security strategy.” Related Books** Yet today, the agency in charge of managing our nation’s maritime sealift capability, the Maritime Administration (or MARAD), is woefully underfunded and managing an aging fleet of vessels that may not be up to the job of moving and sustaining our Armed Forces in an increasingly competitive Asia-Pacific theater of operations. Let’s remember that any conflict in the Pacific will not be sustained by the Navy alone. Our land forces rely on military and civilian sealift capability to fight abroad, and it is not clear that we could sustain a land force in the Pacific with our current sealift capability. Recognizing the defense imperative of sealift capabilities, the combatant command responsible for coordinating the military’s overseas transportation requirements recently announced that buying foreign vessels and re-flagging them under the U.S. flag is its top priority. But while buying used foreign ships from allies is a good start, it is not a solution or a long-term strategy. It’s clear we need a more permanent investment in our maritime infrastructure. In congressional testimony last year, then MARAD Administrator Rear Adm. Mark Buzby (ret.) noted that in the 1990s there were seven large shipyards in the United States building commercial vessels. Since then, three of the yards have closed. Of the remaining four, only one builds commercial vessels and the others do only repairs and maintenance. China’s rising maritime power Meanwhile, China is rapidly expanding its maritime reach through both naval and commercial enterprises. The size and growth of the Chinese navy, coast guard, and long-distance fishing fleets (including the so-called “ maritime militia”) has been well documented. However, Chinese investment in civilian shipbuilding and in strategic port and maritime infrastructure around the world is less well known. China builds over 40% of large ocean-going vessels manufactured globally each year ( over 1,000 per year, compared to approximately 10 per year in the U.S.). Not only that, but Beijing also registers a significant number of these vessels under the Chinese flag ( 4,569 as of January 1, 2020). As of 2021, China maintains an ownership stake in at least 30 of the 50 largest container ports in the world, and has been taking advantage of pandemic-related economic challenges to establish footholds in some of the hardest hit economies, like Panama, whose economy shrunk by about 18% in 2020. Considering that the U.S. is the primary user and beneficiary of the Panama Canal, (over 60% of goods transiting the canal are destined for U.S. ports) increased Chinese control over port infrastructure surrounding the canal could constitute a serious threat to our supply chain. This economic investment comes with strings attached. Not coincidentally, after signing a memorandum of agreement with the Panama Canal Authority in 2017, Panama dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. In short, China seems to have learned a lesson from American naval strategist Admiral Alfred Mahan that America seems to have forgotten: “[C]ontrol of the sea, by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, means predominant world influence.” Why the lack of U.S. commercial ships presents a security risk **With the withdrawal from Afghanistan complete, the long-awaited pivot to the Pacific might actually be taking shape. The AUKUS submarine agreement most recently highlighted the critical state of the maritime theater of operations in maintaining a “ free and open Indo-Pacific.” However, we can’t be so naïve as to think that a military buildup alone will win in this new era of strategic competition. Increasing shipbuilding capability and investing in the American commercial fleet would not only mitigate threats to our supply chain, but would also** serve as an important hedge to China’s **increasingly pervasive and aggressive maritime ambitions. As it stands now, our reliance on foreign vessels for critical trade is a national security risk both in terms of our inability to engage in sustained conflict abroad should that become necessary, but also in terms of supply chain vulnerabilities that will continue to plague us at home. We need not, and of course cannot, end globalization to protect our supply chain. But we can drastically increase the number of U.S. flagged merchant vessels sailing the world’s oceans and strengthen our domestic shipbuilding base to preserve our freedom of action in times of crisis. Without the ability to move and sustain our forces by sea wherever and whenever needed — a major deterrent against aggression — the U.S. (and its allies)** will lose the capacity to ensure regional stability and peace**. This maritime nation should not outsource its maritime needs. Continuing to do so requires that we rely on flag states that are increasingly vulnerable to the influence of foreign adversaries, most notably China. We must invest in our Merchant Marine and shipbuilding capability now, and undertake meaningful legislative efforts to make the U.S., at the very least, a less inconvenient flag state.**

## Defense

### 2NC ⁠— Defense

### 2NC ⁠— AT: Navy

#### A2/AD and hard constraints undermine naval deterrence

van Hooft 21, senior strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the co-chair of its Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, and a former postdoctoral fellow at the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Paul, 2-23-2021, "Don’t Knock Yourself Out: How America Can Turn the Tables on China by Giving Up the Fight for Command of the Seas", *War on the Rocks*, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/dont-knock-yourself-out-how-america-can-turn-the-tables-on-china-by-giving-up-the-fight-for-command-of-the-seas/)

It is no accident that the United States finds itself in its current predicament. China’s strategy over the past decades has deliberately targeted the physical and political constraints that remoteness places on the United States. China’s military planners have invested in building up the number of Chinese surface ships and submarines as well as specifically towards developing its air-, sea-, and land-launched cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Together with sensors and command and control, these missiles make up China’s so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities with which it plans to target not only U.S. aircraft and surface ships, specifically its aircraft carriers, but also its air bases and ports, including Guam. Other weapons are continuously added to the arsenal. In effect, China has pushed what constitutes a hostile coastline far out into the Western Pacific and undermined the ability of the United States to intervene in its proximity.

U.S. officials have grasped for military-technological solutions to maintain or regain command in the region. The new tri-service strategy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, and the Navy’s Battle Force 2045 plan are the latest attempts to overcome China’s cost-imposing strategy. The tri-service strategy continues the emphasis on the growing costs of access in the previous strategies from 2007 and 2015. The 2020 iteration explicitly names China as the pacing threat. It points toward a need for longer-range, so-called “stand-off” weapons to avoid operating within striking range of Chinese capabilities. It proposes increasing the number of ships while also de-emphasizing the role of more powerful but expensive and vulnerable assets, such as aircraft carriers. The strategy is in line with the Battle Force 2045 plan recently introduced by former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. This plan also proposed drastically increasing the number of ships in the U.S. Navy from the current 297 to 500, beyond the previous goal of 355. Both documents mostly foresee this increase through the construction of more unmanned ships.

The strategy represents an improvement over previous plans. Yet, as with the Battle Force 2045 plan, it is arguably too little, too late. For the foreseeable future, the United States lacks the capacity for that scale of naval shipbuilding, including for repair, logistics, and sealift. The U.S. Navy also lacks sufficient resources to execute this strategy (now or in the foreseeable future) without cutting into the resources of the Army, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently noted. Furthermore, current naval force structure is stretched to a breaking point.

More importantly, in their reliance on military superiority, the tri-service strategy and the Battle Force 2045 plan build on a flawed grand strategic foundation. The pursuit of “strategic primacy” through military superiority, as the recently declassified “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific” advocates, plays to Chinese strengths. Sino-American competition would be decided by the outcome of a military confrontation in the waters close to China in which it can largely set the terms. For now, it is unclear whether the administration of President Joe Biden will follow through with these plans, designed and released as they were by the previous administration. In any case, without fully addressing the implications of China’s geographical advantages over the United States, the current maritime plans instead represent the best attempt to execute a faulty grand strategy.

#### Interest asymmetry and political constraints.

van Hooft 21, senior strategic analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, the co-chair of its Initiative on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, and a former postdoctoral fellow at the Security Studies Program at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Paul, 2-23-2021, "Don’t Knock Yourself Out: How America Can Turn the Tables on China by Giving Up the Fight for Command of the Seas", *War on the Rocks*, https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/dont-knock-yourself-out-how-america-can-turn-the-tables-on-china-by-giving-up-the-fight-for-command-of-the-seas/)

Yet, the advantages the United States has as a maritime power paradoxically also presents itself with serious disadvantages. As I recently argued in a special issue in Security Studies on maritime competition, insularity is a mixed blessing. Due to its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, the United States is more secure than any great power in history. This includes Great Britain, which was still close enough to the European continent to be at risk of invasion or blockade. The United States, therefore, has far less at stake than its adversaries and allies in Eurasia. The United States must retain command and be capable of crossing hemispheres without great difficulty precisely because its potential adversaries are already in the other hemisphere. However, the mobile nature of its maritime power ensures that the United States can also easily leave, which makes it more difficult to credibly reassure its Eurasian allies and deter its adversaries. America requires a forward presence to not only facilitate command but also demonstrate it has “skin in the game.” Along the same lines, the United States requires significant technological superiority to feasibly win at low costs.

In short, the United States ends up overcommitting abroad to compensate for the inherent asymmetry in the balance of interests. Simultaneously, American policymakers inflate and oversell threats at home to justify military commitments to a domestic audience. The experience of the United States in Europe during the Cold War is revealing: The United States became more and more entangled in Europe, as well as in peripheral conflicts, to demonstrate its credibility, while at home, its leaders presented the conflict in ever-starker ideological terms. As a consequence, the United States built up commitments in multiple Eurasian regions. It is not only retrenchers who now see the risk of these commitments in an era of great-power competition.

In contrast to their U.S. counterparts, Chinese planners are essentially only solving one military problem against one adversary. As the United States looks to decisively defeat China, China simply focuses on raising the costs of U.S. power projection. By doing so, it can create fissures between the United States and its allies. China does not need to win a possible shooting war, but it must deny the United States a clear victory in one. In other words, China is preparing to do in the seas and archipelagoes of the Western Pacific what insurgents have done over the past two decades in the hills, valleys, and alleys of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The political constraints the United States faces due to its remoteness interact with the physical constraints. The ability to win quickly by breaking the will of the adversary through a paralyzing attack, while keeping U.S. casualties low, has long been part of the American approach to conflict. More than the policymakers of other great powers in history, U.S. leaders deem a high likelihood of a quick victory to be necessary to maintain credibility. Yet, the United States relies on the territory of allies for air bases and ports, pre-positioned fuels and munitions, and supporting personnel for in-region repairs and maintenance. China has ensured it will be dangerous and costly for U.S. armed forces to fly, sail, land and dock, restock, refuel, and resupply.

### 2NC ⁠— Indicts

#### Brand’s wrong

Glaser 18, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (John Glaser, 3-26-2018, "Truth, Power, and the Academy: A Response to Hal Brands," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/truth-power-and-the-academy-a-response-to-hal-brands/)

Most of Brands’ account, however, is just flat out wrong. The evidence repudiates the suggestion, for example, that policymakers are held accountable for their ideas. The Obama administration’s war in Libya is widely considered a failure (Obama said not being prepared for the chaotic aftermath was the “worst mistake” of his presidency). Who in officialdom was held accountable? Which member of the Bush administration – or its Republican and Democratic enablers – suffered real consequences for the crime of preventive war against Iraq? Some point to Republican losses in subsequent elections, or the fact that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fired for mismanagement of the war, as examples of accountability. But Rumsfeld got canned because of particular operational ideas he held about deployment and tactics, not because he favored the war. And short-term electoral losses in the mid-terms or the next presidential election are weak sauce, not just because these fickle changes can hardly rectify past wrongs of such magnitude, but because the same crop of analysts and politicians for whom the Iraq War made perfect sense continue to dominate the foreign policy establishment, both in and out of government. Trump’s decision this week to hire John Bolton, a paragon of everything that is wrong with the war-prone and expert-allergic nature of U.S. foreign policy, as national security advisor is a perfect example of this lack of accountability. As Steve Walt recently pointed out, none of the scholars that signed the famed 2002 full page advertisement in the New York Times opposing the Iraq War have served in policy positions, whereas plenty of people in elected office, the unelected national security apparatus, and the foreign policy commentariat who did support the war continue to dominate these arenas.

But it’s not just the big failures like Iraq and Libya. The ideas that drive these failed policies continue to dominate in Washington. The notion that America should fight preventive wars for the sake of non-proliferation is still widely shared. Fighting wars for the sake of credibility is also popular. Expanding NATO, despite the lack of benefit to U.S. interests and the instability it causes in Eastern Europe, almost amounts to religious doctrine. Despite its steep costs and risky adventurism, a grand strategy of primacy continues to monopolize U.S. foreign policy decision-making. The scholarship-policy gap persists because the people and ideas that drive foreign policy in Washington are not held accountable for their failures, and instead are often rewarded with a lifetime of high-status revolving door positions in the policy and think tank worlds. Bad ideas, particularly hawkish ones, and the people that hold them continue to win the day in Washington. That is not accountability.

Nor does Brands’ discussion of worst-case scenario policymaking ring true. Brands speaks favorably of former Vice President Dick Cheney’s “one percent doctrine,” which says that if a threat has even a one percent chance of becoming a reality, it requires enormous resources to mitigate. The argument that Washington ought to design policies based on inflated threats of worst-case scenarios, instead of the rational cost-benefit risk assessments done by scholars, is dangerously wrong. America’s post-9/11 “War on Terror” policies have done exactly that, and it has led to a host of destabilizing elective wars and egregious overspending on homeland security. Plus, Brands’ reading of history here is selective. On issues ranging from NATO expansion and competition with China, to humanitarian intervention in Libya and beyond, policymakers have roundly espoused best-case scenarios for the outcomes of their policies. Instead, it has been scholars who have warned of worst-case scenarios – citing standoffs with Russia, escalatory risks with China, and the impossibility of reconstructing broken states at any reasonable cost.

In short, Brands has presented the problem in reverse: What needs to be explained is not why academics are out of touch, but why policymakers have been so doggedly resistant to their more reliable counterparts in academia.

One reason is that states resist dissent. Government bureaucracies tend to suppress ideas that challenge the reigning doctrine. The State Department purged officials in the 1940s and 1950s who questioned U.S. support for Chang Kai Shek’s government and presented Communist China as something other than a monolithic threat. During the Vietnam War, the CIA silenced analysts who warned about the strength of the Vietcong. The analysis of intelligence officials who poked holes in the WMD case for the Iraq War were shoved into the footnotes of the National Intelligence Estimate, and dissent from Energy Department scientists about the infamous “aluminum tubes” was quashed.

In addition, states are bad at self-evaluation. As Steven Van Evera argues, “Myths, false propaganda, and anachronistic beliefs persist in the absence of strong evaluative institutions to test ideas against logic and evidence, weeding out those that fail.” Socialization and status quo bias play a big role in the policy echo chamber as well. As Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp underscore, “Ideological thinking also tends to characterize staff members who have had a long period of involvement in a particular area and become committed to a particular doctrine, such as the need for American hegemony.”

Parochial self-interest is a factor, too. As Micah Zenko and Michael Cohen argue, “The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government – defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.” Nobody whose job depends on inflating foreign threats wants to confront their own redundancy or hear that their searching for monsters to destroy is dangerous.

Nor is this just a bureaucratic issue. Elite politicking plays a role as well. As Jack Snyder shows, domestic coalition-building among various political, bureaucratic, and special interest groups in the Cold War era helped “pav[e] the way for a Cold War consensus behind expanded military commitments.” These factions sometimes “resorted to disingenuous strategic exaggerations to sell their program,” resulting in a “spiral of myth-making” that provided “political and intellectual pressure toward global military entanglements.”

Then there are think tanks. One might assume think tanks help mitigate these problems in government. In reality, they are subject to their own perverse incentives that reinforce them. Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan wrote recently that America’s current grand strategy of primacy “serves the interests of U.S. political leaders,” so “there is little demand for arguments questioning it.” Think tank analysis is plagued by an “operational mindset,” which takes existing objectives as a given and provides analysis mostly on how best to implement them, not whether they are wise to begin with. In this, think tanks are frequently beholden, consciously or not, to their funders’ policy preferences. The history of the RAND Corporation’s work on the Vietnam War is a good example. Projects on operational questions got more funding, and research that contradicted official thinking was shunned.

In short, since most think tanks service policymakers rather than guide them, their work tends to reflect the policy preferences of Washington rather than the scholarly consensus. Analysts who want to have an influence on policy face powerful incentivizes to conform to Washington’s preferences. Think tanks thrive on maintaining relevance and the appearance of policy influence, and if advocating for the scholarly consensus on an issue goes against the grain and gets analysts uninvited to the next closed-door meeting or high-prolife event, organizations are wont to assimilate to the agenda in Washington.

This is not to condemn analysts and practitioners as mendacious sell-outs. Most are earnest, well-meaning, and genuine adherents to the policies for which they advocate. Nevertheless, many often knowingly buck ideas that challenge the consensus du jour. I have personally listened to former officials privately take views popular in academia, but abstain from public advocacy because they feel constrained by the narrow parameters of debate in Washington. Fellow think tank analysts have told me of their reluctance to publicly tout policies that lie outside these parameters for fear of sabotaging their viability for a future job in government.

Scholars are not angels. They face their own institutional pathologies and perverse incentives, like everybody else. We should not slip into the logical fallacy of the Appeal to Authority. Still, scholars are far more insulated in this respect than the policy communities in Washington, and the fact that bad ideas, popular in D.C. but unsupported in academia, keep getting the United States into trouble abroad, should say something about the imperative of giving greater credence to scholarship.

#### AND biased---paid off to defend hegemony.

Johnson 19, Contributing Analyst for FAIR Media (Adam, March 19th, “Bloomberg’s Armsmaker-Funded Columnist Wants You to Know: Military Spending Is Woke,” *FAIR Media*, <https://fair.org/home/bloombergs-armsmaker-funded-columnist-wants-you-to-know-military-spending-is-woke/>, Accessed 12-02-2021)

Bloomberg identifies Brands as the “Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.” “Kissinger” is ominous enough, but surely Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is some innocuous, wonky academic institution, no?

In a piece explicitly defending bloated military budgets, however, perhaps it would be useful to know what exactly the “Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments” is. We can start by reading this section taken directly from their website (unabridged):

Below is a list of organizations that have contributed to our efforts over the past three years.

Aerojet Rocketdyne Army Strategic Studies Group Army War College Austal USA Australian Department of Defence BAE Systems Inc. Carnegie Corporation of New York Chemring Group Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Department of the Navy Embassy of Japan Fincantieri/Marinette Free University Brussels General Atomics General Dynamics—National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) Harris Corporation Huntington Ingalls Industries Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Kongsberg Defense Systems, Inc. L3 Technologies, Inc. Lockheed Martin Corporation Maersk Line, Limited Metron National Defense University Navy League of the United States Northrop Grumman Corporation Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Net Assessment (ONA) Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (AT&L) Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych (PISM) Raven Industries Raytheon Company Sasakawa Peace Foundation Sarah Scaife Foundation SEACOR Holdings Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program Smith Richardson Foundation Submarine Industrial Base Council Taiwan Ministry of National Defense Textron Systems The Boeing Company The Doris & Stanley Tananbaum Foundation The Lynde & Harry Bradley Foundation United Kingdom Royal Air Force

Brands is a senior fellow at an organization funded almost entirely by those with a clear interest in the upcoming $750 billion defense budget Brands is pushing for. While we don’t have a tax filings for CSBA since Brand was hired there, and thus we do not know his specific income, the average senior fellow at the organization, as of its last tax filing, makes just under $300,000 a year.

They can call it whatever they wish—”think tank,” “nonprofit,” “Center”—but by any objective metric, this organization is just a lobbying entity for the weapons industry and Western militaries. A cursory glance at their policy briefs reveals they, unsurprisingly, always support more spending on weapons systems. Unlike other weapons-funded lobbying groups such as Center for Strategic and International Studies (FAIR.org, 8/12/16), they don’t even bother throwing some banks or soda companies in there to give the appearance of being anything other than a weapons industry trade group. (Don’t be fooled by the “Sasakawa Peace Foundation”—that’s an organization founded by far-right Japanese business executive Ryoichi Sasakawa, who was jailed as a war crimes suspect after World War II, and who once described himself as the “world’s richest fascist”—Time, 8/26/74.)

Setting aside its disqualifying conflicts of interest, Brands’ piece is an assortment of sophistry about how weapons systems create middle-class jobs for Americans. Given that any meaningful definition of “progressive” must take into account the 95 percent of the world who are not Americans—e.g., those on the other end of these weapons systems and military occupations—the column rests its premise on a massive category error.

#### \*\*\*Writers are sensitive to donors’ interests and they know their articles are cited in Congress.

Walt 18, Professor of International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University (Stephen, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and The Decline of U.S. Primacy, *MacMillan Books*)

Although certain think tanks and research organizations are explicitly nonpartisan and aspire to high standards of scholarship, the line between research and policy advocacy is increasingly blurred.21 As Steven Clemons, an experienced veteran of several think tanks, acknowledged some years ago, such organizations “are less and less committed to genuine inquiry designed to stimulate enlightened policy decisions and more and more oriented to deepening the well-worn grooves of paralyzed debate.”22

Indeed, the overall academic quality of D.C.-based think tanks has declined noticeably over the past thirty years. In the 1980s, for example, the Foreign Policy Studies group at Brookings contained a number of scholars who published regularly in top academic journals and university presses, and several senior fellows were subsequently appointed to tenured positions at elite universities.23 Although full-time Brookings fellows sometimes teach as adjunct faculty members at local universities today, they rarely publish in academic venues and would be unlikely to be considered eligible for senior positions in a top academic department.

In many cases, in fact, think tanks are advocacy organizations masquerading as independent research bodies. Organizations such as the Progressive Policy Institute or the Center for American Progress serve these functions for Democrats, while the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation work mostly on behalf of the GOP. These organizations exist to provide intellectual ammunition for partisan political warfare and are understandably sensitive to the interests of major donors and the political leaders whose agendas they seek to promote. In this way, many prominent think tanks are important adjuncts to the next category.

## Sustainability

### 2NC---Unsustainable

#### 1---COVID, China, and populism.

Cooley & Nexon 20, \*Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, \*\*Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (\*Alexander, \*\*Daniel H., 6/9/20, “How Hegemony Ends”, *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends)

CONSERVING THE U.S. SYSTEM

Great-power contestation, the end of the West’s monopoly on patronage, and the emergence of movements that oppose the liberal international system have all altered the global order over which Washington has presided since the end of the Cold War. In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be further accelerating the erosion of U.S. hegemony. China has increased its influence in the World Health Organization and other global institutions in the wake of the Trump administration’s attempts to defund and scapegoat the public health body. Beijing and Moscow are portraying themselves as providers of emergency goods and medical supplies, including to European countries such as Italy, Serbia, and Spain, and even to the United States. Illiberal governments worldwide are using the pandemic as cover for restricting media freedom and cracking down on political opposition and civil society. Although the United States still enjoys military supremacy, that dimension of U.S. dominance is especially ill suited to deal with this global crisis and its ripple effects.

Even if the core of the U.S. hegemonic system—which consists mostly of long-standing Asian and European allies and rests on norms and institutions developed during the Cold War—remains robust, and even if, as many champions of the liberal order suggest will happen, the United States and the European Union can leverage their combined economic and military might to their advantage, the fact is that Washington will have to get used to an increasingly contested and complex international order. There is no easy fix for this. No amount of military spending can reverse the processes driving the unraveling of U.S. hegemony. Even if Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, knocks out Trump in the presidential election later this year, or if the Republican Party repudiates Trumpism, the disintegration will continue.

The key questions now concern how far the unraveling will spread. Will core allies decouple from the U.S. hegemonic system? How long, and to what extent, can the United States maintain financial and monetary dominance? The most favorable outcome will require a clear repudiation of Trumpism in the United States and a commitment to rebuild liberal democratic institutions in the core. At both the domestic and the international level, such efforts will necessitate alliances among center-right, center-left, and progressive political parties and networks.

What U.S. policymakers can do is plan for the world after global hegemony. If they help preserve the core of the American system, U.S. officials can ensure that the United States leads the strongest military and economic coalition in a world of multiple centers of power, rather than finding itself on the losing side of most contests over the shape of the new international order. To this end, the United States should reinvigorate the beleaguered and understaffed State Department, rebuilding and more effectively using its diplomatic resources. Smart statecraft will allow a great power to navigate a world defined by competing interests and shifting alliances.

The United States lacks both the will and the resources to consistently outbid China and other emerging powers for the allegiance of governments. It will be impossible to secure the commitment of some countries to U.S. visions of international order. Many of those governments have come to view the U.S.-led order as a threat to their autonomy, if not their survival. And some governments that still welcome a U.S.-led liberal order now contend with populist and other illiberal movements that oppose it.

Even at the peak of the unipolar moment, Washington did not always get its way. Now, for the U.S. political and economic model to retain considerable appeal, the United States has to first get its own house in order. China will face its own obstacles in producing an alternative system; Beijing may irk partners and clients with its pressure tactics and its opaque and often corrupt deals. A reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy apparatus should be able to exercise significant influence on international order even in the absence of global hegemony. But to succeed, Washington must recognize that the world no longer resembles the historically anomalous period of the 1990s and the first decade of this century. The unipolar moment has passed, and it isn’t coming back.

#### 2---debt.

Bandow 20, JD, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, 5/28/20, "Want to Fix the Deficit? Bring Home the Troops.", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/us-deficit-military-spending-budget-bring-home-troops/)

The financial burdens of this activist military policy had been growing difficult to bear long before the economic crisis created by the coronavirus pandemic. In June 2019, the Congressional Budget Office forecast trillion-dollar annual deficits as far as the eye can see. The agency warned: “Large budget deficits over the next 30 years are projected to drive federal debt held by the public to unprecedented levels—from 78 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 to 144 percent by 2049.” For comparison: Greece was at a similar deficit level when it was battered by its own debt crisis in the wake of the global financial crisis. If interest rates in the United States grow by just 1 percent, in three decades the federal government’s debt will run 199 percent of GDP. However, well before that level is reached, Washington would risk what the Congressional Budget Office terms “a fiscal crisis—that is, a situation in which the interest rate on federal debt rises abruptly because investors have lost confidence in the U.S. government’s fiscal position.” This would greatly intensify the fiscal crunch.

With the ongoing economic collapse and massive federal bailouts, the federal financial situation has dramatically worsened. At the end of April, the budget office projected a 12 percent drop in real GDP this quarter, an unemployment rate of 14 percent, a likely annual deficit of $3.7 trillion in 2020 and $2.1 trillion next year, and debt at 101 percent of GDP by the end of the fiscal year. Those numbers may well rise. The Manhattan Institute’s Brian Riedl believes the red ink might even hit $4.2 trillion this year. If so, Washington will borrow more this year than during 2014 to 2019 combined.

States also face enormous economic pressures. Most are forced to at least nominally balance their budgets, as only Uncle Sam has a printing press, but their pension funds, which collectively faced a $1 trillion funding hole at the start of the year, are likely to have $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion in unfunded liabilities by December. Some states, most notably Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey, already are at risk. The Democratic House has proposed including a state bailout in its proposal for another $3 trillion in aid.

The debt tsunami cannot continue indefinitely. Last year, Washington spent $4.4 trillion, of which nearly a quarter was borrowed.

There are no simple solutions. Congress is unlikely to raise taxes. In 2017 the federal budget was awash in red ink, but Congress passed a large tax cut. Making ends meet was pushed even further into the future, when government programs presumably would be paid by someone somehow sometime. The alternative is to scale back spending programs—but there isn’t much to cut. Domestic discretionary outlays, which Congress normally targets when intent on reducing expenditures, ran only $661 billion in 2019. These expenditures, at 6.3 percent of GDP, already were below their historical average, 8.4 percent over the last half-century, and wiping out everything would still leave a deficit. A trillion dollars went for Social Security and $644 billion for Medicare last year—both of which make up the traditional, untouchable third rail of U.S. politics. Although proposals for reform abound, President Donald Trump has refused to trim either, and progressive activists continue to push for benefit increases. Other mandatory entitlement programs, with benefits set by law, constituted $642 billion. Medicaid ran $409 billion; it already provides the lowest reimbursement rates of any government program or private health insurance. Net interest payments came to $375 billion. Interest rates have nowhere to go but up, and these outlays cannot be cut without repudiating the debt.

Meanwhile, last year’s military budget was $676 billion. Today most of that is “defense” only in the sense of protecting allies, many of which can defend themselves and little of which can be considered essential for this nation’s security. (Of course, the United States has other less-than-vital interests, in stability, for instance, and thus the defeat of a group like the Islamic State. Yet Washington, too, has proved to be a major force for instability—as in the cases of Iraq and Libya.) Americans may not mind their government turning military alliances into welfare programs when the United States dominates the global economy. But the calculations change when the federal government is racing toward insolvency. In another decade or two, when entitlements are competing with the national debt in spiraling upward, priorities will finally have to be set. And missions that are not essential, such as engaging in nation-building and protecting prosperous, populous allies, are likely to lose out.

Some right-leaning hawks acknowledge the imminent fiscal crunch but blame social programs. The answer, they argue, is simple: entitlements, not the Pentagon, should be slashed. Alas, they have yet to find a credible presidential candidate willing to make that case. Liberal interventionists have an even bigger problem, as most leading progressives want to spend more, much more, on domestic priorities. Creating “Medicare for All” and wiping out student debt would cost trillions of dollars. Despite the veneer of moderation retained by former Vice President Joe Biden, the presidential candidate has shifted leftward to bolster his support among activists.

The bipartisan advocates of promiscuous intervention are likely to resist any military cutbacks. However, once a fiscal crisis hits, dramatic and rapid if not instant reductions will be required. That risks creating a dangerous mismatch with international objectives.

Policymakers should begin, today, by scaling back their interventionist strategies that require such a large and expensive military, with hundreds of bases and hundreds of thousands of troops around the globe. The military budget is the price of America’s foreign policy. A new approach should exercise restraint, scale back national ambitions, and then construct the force structure necessary to achieve more limited goals.

#### 3---Trump---damage is done.

Kirshner 1-29-2020, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. (Jonathan, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-29/trump-gone-not-forgotten)

This is why even though Donald Trump has become a member of a rather exclusive club—one-term U.S. presidents—the Trump presidency will have enduring consequences for U.S. power and influence in the world. Leo Tolstoy warned that “there are no conditions to which a man may not become accustomed, particularly if he sees that they are accepted by those around him,” and it is easy, especially for most insular Americans, to implicitly normalize what was in fact a norm-shattering approach to foreign policy. Level whatever criticisms you may about the often bloodstained hands of the American colossus on the world stage, but Trump’s foreign policy was different: shortsighted, transactional, mercurial, untrustworthy, boorish, personalist, and profoundly illiberal in rhetoric, disposition, and creed.

Some applauded this transformation, but most foreign policy experts, practitioners, and professionals are breathing a sigh of relief that a deeply regrettable, and in many ways embarrassing, interlude has passed. (It is exceedingly unlikely that any future president will exchange “beautiful letters” with and express their “love” for the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.) But such palpable relief must be tempered by a dispiriting truth, rooted in that notion of anarchy: the world cannot unsee the Trump presidency. (Nor, for that matter, can it unsee the way members of the U.S. Congress behaved in the final weeks of the Trump administration, voting opportunistically to overturn an election and helping incite violence at the Capitol.) From this point forward, countries around the globe will have to calculate their interests and expectations with the understanding that the Trump administration is the sort of thing that the U.S. political system can plausibly produce.

Such reassessments will not be to the United States’ advantage. For 75 years, the general presumption that the United States was committed to the relationships and institutions it forged and the norms it articulated shaped the world in ways that privileged U.S. interests. If it is increasingly perceived to be feckless and self-serving, the United States will find the world a more hazardous and less welcoming place.

POWER AND PURPOSE

One country tries to anticipate the foreign policy behavior of another by making assessments about two factors: power and purpose. Measuring the former seems straightforward, although it is often not. (France seemed to boast a formidable military in 1939, and the Soviet Union was considered a superpower a half century later, yet both countries suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed under pressure.) Measuring the latter—purpose—requires more guesswork in practice but is even more important. Is a country a friend or a foe, and in either case, for how long? Is a country’s word its bond, or are its commitments ephemeral and its pronouncements little more than shallow, opportunistic posturing? Ultimately, these are questions of trust and confidence that require judgment calls. And for better or worse, it is easier to partner with a country whose underlying foreign policy orientation is rooted in purposes that are reasonably consistent over time.

For U.S. partners in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, however, Washington’s priorities on the world stage must now be interrogated, and any conclusions reached must be held with qualifications rather than confidence. And there is nothing that President Joe Biden and his team of immaculate professionals can do to stop that. From now on, all countries, everywhere, must hedge their bets about the United States—something that will unnerve allies more than adversaries. Whatever promises are made and best behaviors followed over the next few years, a resurgence of knuckle-dragging America firstism will loom menacingly in the shadows. That possibility will inevitably shape other states’ conclusions about their relations with the United States, even as nearly every world leader rushes to shake the hand of the new U.S. president.

Thus, even with the election of Biden—a traditional, centrist liberal internationalist, cut from the same basic foreign policy cloth of every U.S. president (save one) across nine decades—countries will now have to hedge against the prospect of an indifferent, disengaged, and clumsily myopic U.S. foreign policy. After all, anarchy also demands that states see the world as it is, not as they wish it might be. And the warning signs that the United States is perhaps not the country it once was could not be flashing more brightly.

Although the margin of victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential election was wide (the two candidates were separated by seven million votes, a 4.5 percent edge in the popular vote, and 74 electoral votes), it was not, by any stretch of the imagination, a renunciation of Trump. In 2016, some argued that Trump’s election was a fluke. This was always whistling past the graveyard, but the case could be made. After all, the election hinged on only about 80,000 votes, spread across three swing states. Even with that, but for the historically contingent geographic quirks of Michigan (the Upper Peninsula) and Florida (the Panhandle), those states would have gone blue. And the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton (who did walk away with the popular vote by a large margin), was, for some key constituencies, a suspect candidate.

The 2020 election put to rest the comforting fable that Trump’s election was a fluke. Trump is the United States—or at least a very large part of it. Many Americans will choke on that sentiment, but other countries don’t have the luxury of clinging to some idealized version of the United States’ national character. Trump presided over dozens of ethical scandals, egregious procedural lapses, and startling indiscretions, most of which would have ended the political career of any other national political figure of the past half century. But the trampling of norms barely registered with most of the American public. Nor did the sheer, horrifying incompetence of the administration’s handling of the gravest public health crisis in a century chase Trump from the political scene in disgrace. (Imagine what would have happened to Jimmy Carter, a decent man dealt a difficult hand by an oil shock and the Iranian hostage crisis. Those events were enough to have his approval rating plummet into the 20s and soon send him packing after his landslide defeat in 1980.) Rather, Trump characteristically treated a pandemic that killed well more than a quarter of a million of the people under his charge as a personal inconvenience, to be managed exclusively for perceived political advantage. Even so, 74 million people voted for him—nine million more than did in 2016 and the most votes ever cast for a U.S. candidate for president, with the exception of Biden, who garnered 81 million.

One cannot paint a picture of the American polity and the country’s future foreign policy without including the significant possibility of a large role for Trumpism, with or without Trump himself in the Oval Office. Looking ahead four years, America watchers must anticipate that the next U.S. presidential election could turn out quite differently. This does not bode well for U.S. interests and influence in world politics. As Mark Leonard, the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, observed, “If you know that whatever you’re doing will at most last until the next election, you look at everything in a more contingent way.”

#### 4---polarization.

Kirshner 1-29-2020, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. (Jonathan, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-29/trump-gone-not-forgotten)

Worse, foreign assessments of the United States must consider the possibility that it will soon simply be out of the great-power game altogether. Looked at objectively, the country boasts a colossal economy and commands the world’s most impressive military. But as the old saying about sports teams goes, they don’t play the games on paper, and there are reasons to question whether Washington has the wherewithal to behave as a purposeful actor on the world stage and pursue its long-term interests. The problem is not just that with politics no longer stopping at the water’s edge, U.S. foreign policy could veer unpredictably from administration to administration. It is that the United States is taking on water itself. The country has entered what can only be characterized as an age of unreason, with large swaths of its population embracing wild conspiracy theories. The United States today looks like Athens in the final years of the Peloponnesian War or France in the 1930s: a once strong democracy that has become ragged and vulnerable. France, descending into appeasement, would soon well illustrate that a country consumed by domestic social conflict is not one that will likely be capable of practicing a productive, predictable, or trustworthy foreign policy.

NO MORE BLANK CHECKS

This dystopian scenario may not come to pass. It might not even be the most likely American future. But the logic of anarchy requires that all countries must at least process the United States’ polarization and domestic dysfunction, think through the implications of that scenario in which all bets are off, and imagine a world in which Washington, for all its raw power, is less relevant in world politics. This prospect will invite major reassessments of U.S. behavior.

# 1NR

## Supply Chains

### 1NR---O/V

### 1NR---AT: Sustainable

#### McAfee ignores offshoring and resource constraints.

Hickel 20, Economic anthropologist at Goldsmiths University of London (Jason, October 14th, “A response to McAfee: No, the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” won’t save us,” *MROnline*, https://mronline.org/2020/10/14/a-response-to-mcafee-no-the-environmental-kuznets-curve-wont-save-us/)

3. Next, McAfee turns to resources (at last!). He questions the figures from Material Footprint analysis. There are a few issues to unpack here. First, McAfee confuses offshoring and imports. MF analysis does not only look at materials embodied in production that a nation has offshored, as McAfee seems to believe. It looks at the materials embodied in all the imports that a nation consumes (i.e., the materials involved in the extraction, production and transportation of those imports). This is why MF in the United States is rising, regardless of how much of its industry is offshored at any given time.

Second, McAfee notes that MF data are based on estimates. This is hardly a revelation; indeed, this is the only way to do it, as embodied resources cannot be counted directly. But they are sophisticated estimates, and material flows scientists improve on their methods (and data availability) every year. Is it perfect? No. But it’s the best we have, and, crucially, it’s the only way to meaningfully compare resource use to GDP. Again, McAfee’s method of using domestic material consumption for this purpose (which is the basis of his book), is illegitimate. Compared to illegitimate, using MF data is a dramatic improvement.

Third, McAfee is confused about how footprints are allocated. It’s quite straightforward. The first step is to understand that the products a country imports don’t materialize out of thin air. They come from mines and factories in other countries, all of which involve resources, and those need to be accounted for.  So, for instance, if the U.S. consumes imports from China, then the U.S. footprint includes the resources involved in the infrastructure that produces those goods, in proportion to the share of China’s economy that is organized around U.S. consumption (and, by the same token, a share of materials in U.S. infrastructure is allocated to countries that consume U.S. exports).

McAfee is upset about this, and uses this example to explain why: “if my neighbors bring me a cake the same year they renovate their house, then my consumption of lumber, drywall, and copper pipe goes up as soon as I have a slice.” This example doesn’t work well, however, because the neighbour’s renovation has nothing to do with cake production. A better approach is to imagine that McAfee buys his cake from a bakery. In that case, the materials involved in the bakery should absolutely be counted as embodied in the cake. And if the bakery uses more materials and energy to make its cakes (say, bigger, more energy intensive ovens), then yes, the footprint of the cake goes up.

Of course, if one wants to avoid using MF analysis, one can look at global resource use (where trade is cancelled out), and compare this to global GDP. If we do, we see that global resource use is rising, right along with GDP. There’s no dematerialization, no green growth. In fact, the global economy has been getting more materially intensive over the past couple of decades, not less. And that’s a problem.

#### 2---Any new technology is co-opted to maximize profits and won’t reduce fossil-fuel consumption.

Timothee Parrique et al. 19, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H., July, *Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability*, European Environmental Bureau, <https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf//PC-MS>

6. Insufficient and inappropriate technological change

The debate on the likeliness of future decoupling is, at its very core, a debate on the potential of technological innovation. Decoupling may have not occurred yet, and economic growth may seem biophysically constrained, either because of rising costs of extraction (Reason 1), unforeseen problem shifting (Reason 3), material infrastructure (Reason 4), or limited recycling (Reason 5), but the green growth discourse develops on the assumption that future innovations soon to come would do away with that. In our opinion, this hypothetical argument has several shortcomings having to do with the purpose, unintended consequences, and pace of technological change. Simply put, technological progress is (1) not targeting the factors of production that matter for ecological sustainability and not leading to the type of innovations that reduce environmental pressures; (2) it is not disruptive enough as it fails to displace other undesirable technologies; and (3) it is not in itself fast enough to enable a decoupling that is absolute, global, permanent, large and fast enough. Essentially we are not arguing against innovation in itself. Our point is that technological innovation is most often ambivalent when it comes to addressing environmental issues and that the potential of future technological innovations is most likely too limited, and in any case uncertain. Relying on the belief that technological innovation will bring all necessary solutions to environmental problems appears as an extremely risky and unreasonable bet.

Not leading to relevant innovations

Innovation is not in and of itself a good thing for ecological sustainability. The desirable type of innovation is eco-innovation or one that results “in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pearson, 2008, p.5). But this is only one type among several. In general, firms have an incentive to innovate to economise on the most expensive factors of production to maximise profits. Because labour and capital are usually relatively more expensive than natural resources, more technological progress will likely continue to be directed towards labour- and capital-saving innovations, with limited benefits, if any, for resource productivity and a potential rise in absolute impacts due to more production. But decoupling will not occur if technological innovations contribute to saving labour and capital while leaving resource use and environmental degradation unchanged.

Another issue is that technologies do not only solve environmental problems but also tend to create new ones. Assuming that resource productivity becomes a priority over labour and capital productivity, there is still nothing preventing technological innovations from creating more damage. For example, research into processes of extractions can lead to better ways to locate resources (imaging technologies and data analytics), to extract them (horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, and automated drilling operations), and to transport them (Arctic shipping routes). These innovations may target resource use but with a result opposite to the objective of decoupling, that is more extraction. And this is not even considering unintended side-effects, which often accompany the development of new technologies (Grunwald, 2018).

Not disruptive enough

Another problem has to do with the replacement of harmful technologies. Indeed, it is not enough for new technologies to emerge (innovation), they must also come to replace the old ones in a process of “exnovation” (Kimberly, 1981). What is required is a “push and pull strategy” (Rockström et al., 2017): pushing environmentally-friendly technologies into society and pulling harmful ones, like fossil-based infrastructure, out of it.

First, in reality, such a process is slow and difficult to trigger. Most polluting infrastructures (power plants, buildings and city structures, transport systems) require large investments, which then creates inertia and lock-in (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014, p. 3). Let us, for instance, consider the energy, buildings, and transport sectors, which account for the large majority of world energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Initial lifetime for a nuclear or a coal power plant is about 40 years. Buildings can last at least as much. The average lifetime for a car is 12-15 years, and this is about what it takes for an innovation to spread in the vehicle fleet. The wide availability of petrol refuelling stations gives an infrastructural advantage to petrol-based cars, whereas this is the opposite situation for electric, gas, or hydrogen vehicles that would require different and new supporting infrastructures. Building a highway or a nuclear plant is a commitment to emit for at least as long as these infrastructures will last – Davis and Socolow (2014) speak of “committed emissions.”

Energy is a good case in point: using more renewable energy is not the same as using less fossil fuels. The history of energy use is not one of substitutions but rather of successive additions of new sources of energy. As new energy sources are discovered, developed, and deployed, the old sources do not decline, instead, total energy use grows with additional layers on the energy mix cake. York (2012) finds that each unit of energy use from non-fossil fuel sources displaced less than one-quarter of a unit of its fossil-fuel counterpart, showing empirical support for the claim that expanding renewable energies is far from enough to curb fossil fuel consumption. The relative part of coal in the global energy mix has been reduced since the advent of petroleum but this occurred in spite of absolute growth in the use of coal (Krausmann et al., 2009).

### 1NR---!---Disease

#### Globalization increases the risk of extinction

Bar-Yam 16 – Complex Systems Scientists and President @ New England Complex Systems Institute

(Yaneer, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” 6/3/16, https://medium.com/complex-systems-channel/transition-to-extinction-pandemics-in-a-connected-world-153867fe98f4)

When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold.




Figure 4: The probability of survival makes a sharp transition (red line) from one to zero as we add more long range transportaion (horizontal axis). The right line (black) holds for different model parameters, so we need to study at what point the transition will take place for our world. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

**Trade is the reason that diseases overwhelm burnout and cause extinction**

Hamburg 8**—**FDA Commissioner.Senior Scientist Nuclear Threat Initiative. MD (Margaret, Germs Go Global: Why Emerging Infectious Diseases Are a Threat to America, http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/GermsGoGlobal.pdf, AMiles)

Globalization, the worldwide movement toward economic, financial, trade, and communications integration, has impacted public health significantly. Technology and economic interdependence allow diseases to spread globally at rapid speeds. Experts believe that the increase in international travel and commerce, including the increasingly global nature of food handling, processing, and sales contribute to the spread of emerging infectious diseases.47 Increased global trade has also brought more and more people into contact with zoonosis -- diseases that originated in animals before jumping to humans. For example, in 2003, the monkeypox virus entered the U.S. through imported Gambian giant rats sold in the nation’s under-regulated exotic pet trade. The rats infected pet prairie dogs, which passed the virus along to humans.48 International smuggling of birds, brought into the U.S. without undergoing inspection and/or quarantine, is of particular concern to public health experts who worry that it may be a pathway for the H5N1 “bird flu” virus to enter the country. Lower cost and efficient means of international transportation allow people to travel to more remote places and potential exposure to more infectious diseases. And the close proximity of passengers on passenger planes, trains, and cruise ships over the course of many hours puts people at risk for higher levels of exposure. If a person contracts a disease abroad, their symptoms may not emerge until they return home, having exposed others to the infection during their travels. In addition, planes and ships can themselves become breeding grounds for infectious diseases. The 2002-2003 SARS outbreak spread quickly around the globe due to international travel. SARS is caused by a new strain of coronavirus, the same family of viruses that frequently cause the common cold. This contagious and sometimes fatal respiratory illness first appeared in China in November 2002. Within 6 weeks, SARS had spread worldwide, transmitted around the globe by unsuspecting travelers. According to CDC, 8,098 people were infected and 774 died of the disease.49 SARS represented the first severe, newly emergent infectious disease of the 21st century. 50 It illustrated just how quickly infection can spread in a highly mobile and interconnected world. SARS was contained and controlled because public health authorities in the communities most affected mounted a rapid and effective response. SARS also demonstrated the economic consequences of an emerging infectious disease in closely interdependent and highly mobile world. Apart from the direct costs of intensive medical care and disease control interventions, SARS caused widespread social disruption and economic losses. Schools, hospitals, and some borders were closed and thousands of people were placed in quarantine. International travel to affected areas fell sharply by 50 - 70 percent. Hotel occupancy dropped by more than 60 percent. Businesses, particularly in tourism-related areas, failed. According to a study by Morgan Stanley, the Asia-Pacific region’s economy lost nearly $40 billion due to SARS.51 The World Bank found that the East Asian region’s GDP fell by 2 percent in the second quarter of 2003.52 Toronto experienced a 13.4 percent drop in tourism in 2003.53

#### We control turns case: pandemics cause global conflicts---but the inverse isn’t true

Daniel Altman 10. North Yard Economics and New York University. “Causal Effects of Epidemics on Conflict: A Summary of the Evidence.” February. <http://www.danielaltman.com/data/Altman_EpidemicsConflict.pdf>.

The most difficult issue in interpreting the links between epidemics and conflict is that of causality. One can imagine several possible relationships between epidemics and conflict, with causality flowing in both directions. An epidemic may lead to conflict if it erodes economic conditions to the point where people are desperate enough to attack a ruling elite or to grab for resources in neighboring countries. Epidemics may also foment a civil conflict if a government’s inability to deal with them reduces confidence in its leadership. An epidemic may also export conflict, if refugees fleeing the spread of disease cause instability in the countries where they settle.¶ Conversely, conflicts may help epidemics to spread. Military forces and their supply networks can cover great distances during a campaign, taking a disease along with them. Sometimes they may use sex as a weapon, creating contagion through forced intimacy. Disease also spreads easily in military camps, where many people are backed together in conditions that are not always sanitary. There are indirect effects, too; if a country is involved in conflict, it may also have less money to pay for the public health interventions that could stop a disease’s transmission¶ There is one important distinction to draw between these two directions of causality. Conflicts may worsen an epidemic, but they cannot start one (except via a biological weapon, which is virtually unheard of). Epidemics, by contrast, may be able to spark a conflict on their own or in combination with other factors. Epidemics and conflicts are both difficult to stop once they start, but this difference makes the first direction of causality – from epidemic to conflict – particularly interesting.

### 1NR---!---War

#### 4---Increased screening incentives outweigh opportunity costs.

Spaniel & Malone 19 — William Spaniel: Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone: Department of Political Science, Stanford University (March 5th; *The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War*; <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>; Date Accessed 03-04-2021)

Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party’s opponent has a second-order effect of exacerbating informational asymmetries about that opponent’s willingness to maintain peace. We derive conditions under which war can occur more frequently and empirically showcase the model’s implications through a case study of Sino-Indian relations from 1949 to 2007.This finding challenges how scholars traditionally believe economic interdependence mediate incentives to fight: instruments like trade have competing effects on the probability of war.

Introduction

What is the relationship between opportunity costs and war? Most political scientists invoke the “opportunity cost mechanism” to explain why commerce, trade ties, and other economic transactions decrease the probability of conflict.1As potential gains from interdependence increase, opportunity costs also rise. The range of mutually preferable settlements expands and the probability of war correspondingly drops (Fearon 1995; Oneal and Russett 2001; Polachek and Xiang 2010). In sum, changing opportunity costs underscore one of the most popular theories of war.

However, not all scholars believe opportunity costs are a panacea for war.2 The historical record contains empirical inconsistencies in this relationship. At times, conflicts have arisen despite increased economic interdependence between parties, fueling concerns over when and whether opportunity costs reduce conflict. We therefore ask a simple question: holding all else equal, does increasing opportunity costs for war decrease the probability of conflict?3

In this paper, we develop a model that reconciles this puzzle by showing both proponents and skeptics of the opportunity cost mechanism are right. Instruments like trade have competing effects on the probability of war. How is this true? Despite raising the price of war, opportunity costs also have an indirect, second order effect of exacerbating uncertainty about a state’s resolve, which is among the most popular mechanisms that explain war.4Which effect is stronger? We show that the latter effect can dominate in equilibrium—that is, the probability of war increases despite raising opportunity costs.

The intuition falls back on screening models where a proposer is uncertain about its opponent’s willingness to fight. Broadly, the uninformed state can pursue two strategies under these conditions. First, it can offer a generous amount that resolved types would accept. This has the benefit of avoiding the costs of war. Alternatively, it can propose a stingy settlement and screen the opponent’s willingness to fight, causing unresolved types to accept while inducing resolved types to reject. The latter benefits the proposer by giving it a large share of the settlement when the opponent accepts, but also forces it to pay the costs of war if its screening offer backfires.

When the difference between the costs of war for types is small, the proposing state has less incentive to screen. Why? Screening still forces the proposer to risk war, but the prospective gains from such a settlement are minimal. However, as the costs of conflict grow, a state is more likely to issue more aggressive demands because of a divergence in relative valuations among types. As the difference in relative costs between types increases, stingy offer strategies become more attractive. For the proposer, the increased screening incentives can outweigh the increased opportunity cost of conflict. This causes the proposer to risk war and trade breakdown by making more aggressive demands. Thus, increasing opportunity costs can have a countervailing effect of raising the risk of war even though these costs are common knowledge.

Our model verifies this counterintuitive relationship. It also generates comparative statics on when the uncertainty effect dominates over the opportunity cost effect. We focus on the role of opportunity costs in economic interdependence theory given its popularity. To preview, the effect arises as trade flows increase because a state cannot observe how its opponent weighs the benefits of trade relative to the costs of fighting. The probability of war increases when the state facing this uncertainty internalizes a larger portion of the military costs than the benefits of trade relative to their opponent’s internalization. The conditional effect introduced here suggests caution in making broad claims about the relationship between trade and war, though the scope conditions the model generates provide a straightforward substantive interpretation that scholars can exploit.

#### 5---It makes wars likelier and longer.

Paganelli and Schumacher 19 (Maria Pia, Professor of Economics at Trinity University, and Reinhard, Professor of Physics at Carnegie Mellon University, “Do not take peace for granted: Adam Smith’s warning on the relation between commerce and war,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 2019, <https://academic.oup.com/cje/article-abstract/43/3/785/5127359>, DOA: 1-5-2020) //Snowball

Does commerce bring about peace? Contrary to what is commonly believed, one of the most famous promoters of the civilising role of commerce seems to answer the question with a negative warning. Commerce, and the wealth commerce creates, may not decrease international conflicts; they may actually increase them. This is not because commerce is an extension of war or because commerce does not offer a ‘bond of friendship’. It is rather because of a set of perverse incentives: commerce and the wealth it brings about increase the power of commercial interest groups and decrease the relative and the perceived costs of wars.

Analysing the positions of Smith introduces an economic analysis and offers a fresh contribution to open a debate on the effects of commerce on warfare and the probability of current wars. For Smith, the development of commercial societies brings about justice and order at home, and more humanity both in peace and in war, but it also increases the likelihood and the likely duration of wars. Economic development, which varies from country to country, increases the inequality in international wealth— a possible motive for increasing the frequency of international wars, as richer countries become enticing targets of poorer countries.25 In addition, for Smith, the likelihood of wars increases with the increase in commerce because the ‘mean rapacity’ of merchants and manufacturers ‘intimidates’ the legislature and wrongly convinces the population that establishing monopolies and higher profits for themselves is actually good for the country. The majority of the population supports more wars because it can ‘dream of empire’ at a relatively low price. Soldiers can be taken out of productive work without affecting the subsistence of the rest of the population, differently from non-commercial societies, in which wars cannot last long because the country is too poor to support troops for long periods of time without starvation. For Smith, the relative price of war decreases with the increase in commerce, and as with all price decreases, the decrease in the price of war increases the quantity demanded of wars. In addition, for Smith, even if the absolute cost of war increases, the ability to pay increases too, thanks to the availability of debt financing of commercial societies. Debt financing decreases the perceived cost of war, generating increasing support for more frequent and longer wars.

### 1NR---!---Populism

### 1NR---!----Deforestation

### 1NR---AT: Chemicals

#### No link---their evidence is about tariff reductions, but tariffs are rampant in the status.

Kristen 2AC Hays 18 [Yellow], Senior Petrochemicals Editor at Platts, “US Chemical Industry Caught in US-China Trade War”, Platts Petrochemicals Special Report, October 2018, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/plattscontent/\_assets/\_files/en/specialreports/petrochemicals/us-china-trade-war.pdf

INTRODUCTION The US chemical industry is in the crosshairs of escalating trade tensions between the US and China that have spawned tariffs on hundreds of products from both countries. From steel and parts needed to build multibillion-dollar plants to numerous raw-material chemicals and plastics produced, tariffs have affected hundreds of billions of dollars in commerce between the world’s two largest economies, and markets are responding accordingly. US petrochemical market participants say Chinese customers increasingly seek other sources for resins and chemicals that once flowed freely from the US, wary of current tariffs and threatened ones that could come into play while shipments are in transit. The American Chemistry Council has vehemently opposed tariffs, arguing that fallout from the additional costs and shifting trade flows will create unintentional, long-term consequences that could threaten the growth of the US as a global supplier. “There is no acceptable tariff rate for global chemicals trade with China or any US trading partner. Only zero tariffs will maximize our industry’s potential to deliver innovative products to new regions and increase social, environmental and economic sustainability around the world,” ACC President Cal Dooley said in September when President Donald Trump’s administration imposed a third round of tariffs on Chinese products valued at $200 billion.

#### Trade causes chemical emissions

**Cribb, 17**—principal of JCA, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, former Director, National Awareness, CSIRO (Julian, “The Poisoner,” *Surviving the 21st Century* Chapter 6)

There are two essential points about the Earthwide chemical flood. First it is quite new. It began with the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and has exploded in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a new crescendo in the early twenty-first century. It is something our ancestors never faced—and to which we, in consequence, lack any protective adaptations which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons. Second, the toxic flood is, for the most part, preventable. It is not compulsory—but is an unwanted by-product of economic growth. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. Regulatory Failure Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. Regulation has so far failed to make any serious curtailment of this flood: only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use. At such a rate of progress it will take us more than 50,000 years to identify and prohibit or restrict all the chemicals which do us harm. Even then, bans will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and will not protect the Earth system nor humanity at large. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. Furthermore, the chemical industry is relocating from the developed world (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) and into developing countries, mainly in Asia, where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law. However, its toxic emissions return to citizens in well-regulated countries via wind, water, food, wildlife, consumer goods, industrial products and people. The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues. Chemical Extinction Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that it is possible for living creatures to pollute themselves into oblivion, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder. While it is unlikely that human chemical emissions alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilisation, it is likely they will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which man-made chemicals might imperil the human future include: Undermining the immune systems, physical and mental health of the population through growing exposure to toxins Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, rendering humanity less able to solve its problems and adapt to major changes; and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society, which is closely linked to lower IQ. Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. By poisoning the ecosystem services—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—on which humanity depends for its own survival and thereby contributing to potential global ecosystem breakdown By augmenting the global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and hence the risk of their use by nations or uncontrollable fanatics.

### 1NR---AT: Internet Freedom

#### No internet impact

Mnookin 12, teaches science writing at MIT and blogs at the Public Library of Science, Download the Universe (Seth Mnookin, 3-23-2012, "The Frozen Future of Nonfiction", http://www.downloadtheuniverse.com/dtu/2012/03/why-the-net-matters-how-the-internet-will-save-civilization-by-david-eagleman-canongate-books-2010-for-ipad-by-set.html)

At least, that’s what I assumed before I read Why The Net Matters, Eagleman’s frustrating 2010 e-book about how and why the Internet will save civilization. (I reviewed the $7.99 iPad version, which is the platform it was designed for; a stripped-down, text-based version is available on the Kindle for the portentous price of $6.66.) The problems start with Eagleman’s premise, which is so vague and broad as to be practically meaningless. There are, he writes, just “a handful of reasons” that civilizations collapse: “disease, poor information flow, natural disasters, political corruption, resource depletion and economic meltdown.” Lucky for us (and Eagleman does offer readers “[c]ongratulations on living in a fortuitous moment in history”), the technology that created the web “obviates many of the threats faced by our ancestors. In other words...[t]he advent of the internet represents a watershed moment in history that just might rescue our future.” On the other hand, it just might not: In order to make his point, Eagleman either ignores or doesn’t bother to look for any evidence that might undercut it. The first of six “random access” chapters that make up the bulk of Why The Net Matters is devoted to “Sidestepping Epidemics,” like the smallpox outbreak that helped bring down the Aztec Empire. In the future, Eagleman writes, the “protective net,” in the form of telemedicine, telepresence (“the ability to work remotely via computer”), and sophisticated information tracking, will save us from these outbreaks. That all sounds lovely, but what of the fact that we’re currently experiencing a resurgence in vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles...a resurgence which is fueled in no small part by misinformation spread over that very same “protective net”? A few chapters later, in a section celebrating the benefits of the hive mind, Eagleman invokes Soviet pseudoscientist Trofim Lysenko, a famed quack who took over the U.S.S.R.’s wheat production under Stalin. Because the Soviet Union spanned 13 time zones, Eagleman writes, “central rule-setting was disastrous for wheat production. … Part of the downfall of the USSR can be traced to this centralization of agricultural decisions.” That sounds nice, and might even be true—but it’s not a point that’s supported by Lysenko, whose main shortcoming was not that he believed in a one-size-fits-all approach; it was that he was a fraud. Moving to the present day, Eagleman addresses wildfires that swept through Southern California in 2007, which, he writes, “brought into relief the relationship between natural disasters and the internet.” At the beginning of the outbreak in October, Californians were glued to their television screens, hoping to determine if their own homes were in danger. But at some point they stopped watching the televisions and turned to other sources. A common suspicion arose that the news stations were most concerned with the fate of celebrity homes in Malibu and Hollywood; mansions that were consumed by the flames took up airtime in proportion to their square footage, which made for gripping video but a poor information source about which areas were in danger next. So people be­gan to post on Twitter, upload geotagged cell phone photos to Flickr, and update Facebook. I had been fairly obsessed with the wildfires, and since I didn’t remember this “common suspicion,” I decided to check the article Eagleman cites as the source of this info, which was a Wired blog post titled “Firsthand Reports from California Wildfires Pour Through Twitter.” It contained no references to a celebrity-obsessed news media; instead, the piece described how “the local media [was] overwhelmed.” It also talked about a San Diego resident who was “[a]cting as an ad hoc news aggregator of sorts” by “watching broadcast television news, listening to local radio reports and monitoring streaming video on the web” and then posting information, along with info gleaned from IMs, text messages, and e-mails, to his Twitter account.

#### More alt causes---space weather and cyberattacks make it inevitable

Eagleman, same as author, 12, (David Eagleman, 7-10-2012, "Four ways the Internet could go down," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2012/07/10/tech/web/internet-down-eagleman/index.html)

Editor’s Note: David Eagleman is a neuroscientist, Guggenheim Fellow, and New York Times bestselling author. His latest books are “Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain” and “Why the Net Matters.” CNN — The Internet was designed to be robust, fault-tolerant and distributed, but its technology is still in its infancy. The fact that the Web has not stopped functioning in its initial decades sometimes encourages us to assume that it never will. But like any system, biological or man-made, the Internet has the potential to fail. Monday’s “DNSChanger” malware problem, which affected some 200,000 computers, was much hyped and ultimately inconsequential. But here are four maladies that really do have the potential to wipe out Internet access on a massive scale. Monday’s Internet blackout: Justifiable hysterics or just hype?

1. Space weather

When you think about Web surfing, you probably don’t worry about what’s happening on the surface of the sun 92 million miles away. But you should. Solar flares are one of our most serious threats for our communication systems. Consider satellite failures. One afternoon in 1998, the Galaxy IV, a $250 million satellite floating 35,000 kilometers above the planet, suddenly spun out of control. The main suspect is a solar flare: the sun was acting up at that time, and several other satellites (owned by Germany, Japan, NASA and Motorola) all failed at the same moment. The effects were instant and worldwide. Eighty percent of pagers instantly went down. Physicians, managers and drug dealers all across the United States looked down and realized they were no longer receiving pages. NPR, CBS, Direct PC Internet and dozens of other services went down. It is estimated that in recent years at least 12 satellites have been lost due to the effects of space weather. But it’s not just satellites that we have to worry about. When a massive solar flare erupts on the sun, it can cause geomagnetic storms on the Earth. The largest solar eruption recorded so far was in 1859. Known as the Carrington flare, it sent telegraph wires across Europe and America into a sparking frenzy. Since that time, the technology blanketing the planet has changed quite a bit. If we were to get another solar flare of that size now, what would happen? The answer is clear to space physicists and electrical engineers: it would blow out transformers and melt down our computer systems. In a small disruption in 1989, an electromagnetic storm arrested power throughout most of Quebec and halted the Toronto stock market for three hours. A major solar event could theoretically melt down the whole Internet. What earthquakes, bombs, and terrorism cannot do might be accomplished in moments by a solar corona. Given our dependence on the communication systems of our planet, both satellite- and ground-based, this is not simply a theoretical worry. The next major geomagnetic storms are expected at the peak of the next solar sunspot cycle in mid-2013, so hang on tight.

2. Cyberwarfare

Wars of the future will be fought less by rugged soldiers in the field and more by smart kids perched in front of computers slamming energy drinks. As our dependence shifts onto the Net, so do our vulnerabilities. As our dependence shifts onto the Net, so do our vulnerabilities. David Eagleman This future can already be detected in the tight relationship between corporeal conflicts and cyber attacks. When one examines the physical conflicts between India and Pakistan, the Israelis and Palestinians or the parties in the collapse of Yugoslavia, the escalation of real-world violence is immediately mirrored by cyber-space warfare. The main targets in cyberwar are largely military targets, but increasingly large multinational corporations serve just as well. Take one of them down, even temporarily, and you have done more damage to the economy of your enemy than scores of soldier deaths. Since the beginning of the computer era, the 1960s, there have been computer viruses: programs that latch onto a host system to reproduce themselves and send out new copies. Just as in biology, as computers have evolved in sophistication, so have viruses co-evolved. And the cousins to the viruses, worms, do not even need a host system but can multiply themselves over networks. Given the defenses in place, are these parasites only a minor theoretical concern? No. Consider the Stuxnet worm that raised its head in 2010. This worm zigzagged its way into Iranian industrial systems, reprogrammed them, hid its tracks and wrecked the factory operations. Seemingly coming from nowhere, Stuxnet introduced itself as a destructive, unstoppable herald of what’s to come. It will surprise no one that cyberwarfare of the future will involve targeting not only military and industrial targets but Internet connectivity for the general population. If you want to take down your enemy, start by shredding his Net.